Editors' Summary. In the 30 years between 1950 and 1980, the population of the developing world almost doubled—from 1.7 to 3.3 billion. Among the most conspicuous signs of this increase are the growth of cities and, in some areas, international labor migration. Since 1950 the cities in Africa, Asia, and Latin America have been growing more than twice as fast as those in North America and Europe. Some of the biggest cities are growing fastest—by as much as 8 percent each year. At this rate they will double in less than a decade. About 40 percent of this growth is due to migration and 60 percent to the children born in the cities to natives and the newly arrived migrants. Altogether, about one billion people (1,000 million) now live in developing-country cities, where fewer than 300 million lived in 1950.

About 15 to 20 million workers, mostly from developing countries, are now international migrants. About half travel to Europe and the US, the rest to other developing countries. Many of the migrants, especially to the US, Europe, or the Middle East, want to bring their families eventually and settle permanently. Migration to African destinations is more likely to be temporary or seasonal, while Latin American and Asian patterns are mixed.

Policy makers in developing countries are voicing concern about the highly visible social, economic, and political problems created by rapid urbanization and by large-scale international labor migration. While governments have tried a variety of policies to influence population distribution, most have been limited in scope and had little success. As long as birthrates remain high in some areas and large differences in wages exist between jobs in different places, most of these policies have little hope of stopping or reversing long-term trends. Family planning programs, although they do not create immediate jobs or higher wages in rural areas, can help to reduce the high birthrates that produce an ever-increasing supply of potential migrants. They also directly address the source of 60 percent of urban growth: natural increase.

Economic Motivations

The main reasons for both rural-to-urban and international migration are economic. Except in the case of refugees (not covered in this report), most migrants move because they expect to find better jobs and higher wages in the new location. Often the decision to migrate may be made by the family because the money that migrants send home adds to and diversifies family income. In general, migrants are young (ages 15 to 35), better educated, and more willing to take risks than nonmigrants. Migrants tend to choose the same destinations as previous migrants whom they know and who help them to find jobs. Mass media from the cities and abroad also stimulate migration, while modern transportation reduces travel time and costs.

Migrants usually benefit by their moves and make more money than before, even at unskilled jobs. Fertility drops from the large family size characteristic of rural areas to almost the same level as other urbanites. Most migrants adapt quickly to a new life, but there is social disruption, which can include postponing marriage or leaving families behind. International migrants tend to make more money but suffer greater social disruption because they usually travel farther and face a different culture and language.

Effects of Migration Mixed

At first, urbanization in developing countries was welcomed as a natural, necessary, and beneficial aspect of modernization. Then visible impacts— crowding, squat-ter settlements, polluted air and water, and traffic congestion in the cities—raised doubts. Many feared that there were not enough productive jobs in the city for the burgeoning urban workforce. Now economists are again pointing to higher incomes and higher productivity in the cities as signs that urban growth, however painful, means progress. Better schooling, available health care, and
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Phyllis T. Piotrow, Ph.D., Director; Walter W. Stender, Associate Director; Ward Kinehart, Editor.

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smaller families mean more opportunity for the children of migrants. Even with unemployment, underemployment, and exploitation in the cities, both the rich and the poor — and the nation as a whole — may be better off than if the migrants had remained in rural areas, where incomes are even lower and chances for advancement, limited.

Although often resented by the natives, international migrants may take jobs that natives reject and work hard to provide goods and services that might otherwise not be available. The low pay they accept helps to keep prices down. To what extent they actually take jobs from native workers or burden the social welfare system is much debated. Nevertheless, friction over jobs may develop between migrants and other unskilled or minority workers or between different language groups.

For the areas that migrants leave, a major benefit is the remittances that they send back. These remittances provide better food and housing and raise the standard of living in those households. Remittances are also spent for land or conspicuous consumption. More local opportunities for investment would increase the economic benefit of remittances.

Other effects of out-migration and emigration depend on specific conditions. On one hand, the departure of migrants reduces the labor supply and thus theoretically leads to less unemployment and higher rural wages. On the other hand, it adds to the work load of those left behind — especially women — and may lead to shifts in use of land and equipment that benefit some people at the expense of others. In the long run, as long as rural birthrates remain high, rural incomes and especially the incomes of the poorest workers are likely to remain well below urban levels, thus stimulating continued migration.

Government Policies and Programs

Governments concerned that rapid urban growth might slow economic development have attempted various policy measures. Some seek to discourage migration by means of:

- rural development programs to create jobs and make rural life more attractive,
- limitations on urban housing and employment, and
- control of individual movement by passes and permits.

Others seek to divert migration from the largest cities by means of:

- incentives for industry and workers to move to small cities,
- colonization policies to support new rural or frontier settlements, and
- new capital cities.

Most of these efforts require long-term political commitment, considerable funds, administrative efficiency, and sometimes coercion. Results have been mixed, since some projects, such as improving rural education and building roads, may encourage people to move to the cities. Moreover, other national policies, such as high urban minimum wage levels, artificially low food prices in cities, and centralized government administration, stimulate migration to the major cities and usually overwhelm any explicit migration policies to the contrary. Policies to manage and channel rural-to-urban migration in order to maximize its benefits may be more effective than policies to prevent it.

International migration policies have had little more success. Widespread restrictions on immigration have not prevented illegal entries nor kept temporary migrants from settling. There may be as many as 10 million illegal migrants in the US, Western Europe, Venezuela, West Africa, and elsewhere. In times of prosperity international migrants — legal or illegal — are welcomed or tolerated because their labor is needed. In times of recession, however, migrants may be expelled and sent home to countries that have no jobs to offer them. Sending countries usually encourage migration, since the migrants send valuable foreign exchange home — as much as $24 billion (US) in 1976. Labor-exporting countries seek to channel these remittances into investment, to protect their citizens working abroad, and sometimes to repatriate the most skilled emigrants.

Role of Family Planning

While family planning programs have not in the past been considered part of population distribution policies, they can have an important long-term effect. Reductions in urban fertility directly affect the major source of urban growth, while reductions in rural fertility can help ease the pressure for out-migration to the cities or for emigration overseas. As the relationship between population growth policies and population distribution policies becomes more apparent, family planning programs will be recognized not only as a valuable family health measure but also as an essential part of effective population distribution policy.

End of Editors’ Summary.
POPULATION GROWTH AND EXPANDING CITIES

World population has increased rapidly in the last three decades. In 1950 there were 2.5 billion people on earth. In 1980 there were 4.4 billion (627, 634) (see Figure 1). Much of this increase has taken place in developing countries, where reductions in death rates have not been accompanied by comparable reductions in birthrates. Between 1950 and 1980, the population of Latin America and Africa more than doubled, while in East Asia and South Asia population almost doubled (627):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1980</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>220 million</td>
<td>470 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>164 million</td>
<td>364 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>673 million</td>
<td>1,175 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>716 million</td>
<td>1,404 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In many developing countries annual rates of population growth exceed 2 percent, so populations double in less than 35 years. Because of some reductions in fertility during the 1970s, the annual rate of world population growth has declined from 1.96 percent in the 1950s and 1960s to 1.70 percent in the early 1980s (627). Nevertheless, with a world population of 4.4 billion people now increasing at 1.70 percent annually, about 75 million people are being added each year. If these rates continue for the next five years, world population will increase by about 375 million, or the equivalent of the current population of all the cities of Africa and Latin America combined (627).

Rapid Urban Growth and Urbanization

One of the most conspicuous features of rapid population change in developing countries and one that has aroused much government concern is the rapid growth of cities (see Table 1). Between 1950 and 1980 urban populations in developing countries grew three and a half times, from 275 to 972 million (see Figure 1). During the 1960s, the fastest growing cities — such as Baghdad, Lagos, and Seoul — grew at rates greater than 7 percent annually (see Table 2), doubling in size in less than 11 years. Such rapid expansion is transforming both the scale of cities and the distribution of large cities between developed and developing countries. In 1950 there were only three cities with more than 10 million people — New York, London, and Tokyo. By the year 2000, if current growth rates continue, there will be 25 of these huge cities in the world, 20 of them in developing countries. The largest, Mexico City, will have almost 30 million people (634) (see Figure 2).

Not only has city size increased rapidly (urban growth), but also the proportion of the population living in cities has increased (urbanization). Urbanites made up 17 percent of total developing-country population in 1950 and 31 percent in 1980. (By comparison, in developed countries 70 percent lived in cities in 1980.) By the year 2000, it is estimated, 43 percent of all people in developing countries will live in urban areas (629). From 1970 to 1975 there was a net transfer of more than 60 million people from rural to urban areas in developing countries (623). In India 4.5 percent of the 1951 rural population — more than 13 million people — had moved to urban areas by 1971 (301).

Figure 1. Urban and Total Populations of Developed and Developing Countries, 1950–2000


Urban population growth closely parallels total population growth in both developed and developing countries. The cities of developing countries are projected to continue growing rapidly, as is their total population. By comparison, developed-country total population and cities are growing slowly.

Figure 2. Ten Largest Metropolitan Areas in the Year 2000: Population Growth, 1960–2000


Cities in developing countries are growing much more rapidly than cities in developed countries. By the year 2000, eight of the 10 largest cities in the world will be in developing countries. Each will have more than 13 million people, and the two largest—Mexico City and Shanghai—will each have more than 25 million.
While urban growth is rapid and urbanization proceeds steadily throughout the developing world, there are some important regional differences (see Figure 3, p. M-251). In Latin America and East Asia urban growth rates peaked early, during the 1950s, while they are only now peaking in Africa and South Asia. Urbanization is relatively more advanced in Latin America, which was 65 percent urban in 1980, than in East Asia (33 percent urban), Africa (29 percent urban), and South Asia (25 percent urban) (629, 634).

Cities of different sizes are growing faster in different areas. In Latin America the largest cities — those with more than four million people — are growing fastest. In Africa the small cities — those with fewer than 250,000 people — are growing fastest. The largest and smallest are growing equally fast in East Asia, while cities of intermediate size are leading in South Asia (629).

Migration Versus Natural Increase
There are three components of urban growth:

- migration,
- reclassification of some rural areas to urban, and
- natural increase — the difference between birth and death rates.

In developing countries about 40 percent of all urban growth is caused by in-migration and reclassification, and 60 percent is caused by natural increase of current city dwellers (629). In some of the largest and fastest growing cities of developing countries, however, migration has accounted for up to two-thirds of urban growth (see Table 2). The relative contributions of in-migration and natural increase vary not only from place to place, but also in the same city over time (518).
The distinction between the effects of migration and natural increase may be blurred because, after migrants' arrival in the city, they bear children, who are counted as part of natural increase rather than migration. The Mexico City area, one of the fastest growing in the world, provides a good example. Between 1970 and 1976 an average of over 500 migrants arrived in Mexico City each day. Most were young men and women in their fertile years. They accounted for about 50 percent of the population increase. Yet, over about the same period, migrants plus their children accounted for an estimated 74 percent of the total population growth in some outlying parts of Mexico City. In 1970 an estimated 72 percent of all births were to women who had migrated to those areas in the preceding decade.

The growth in urban populations of developing countries closely parallels the growth of total population. A correlation analysis by the Population Division of the United Nations found that urban growth rates in 1,212 cities were more closely related to national rates of population growth than to various national per capita economic indicators. According to this analysis, for every one percent difference in the national rate of population growth, there is a one percent difference in the urban growth rate.

**INTERNATIONAL LABOR MIGRATION**

Compared with internal, rural-to-urban migration, international labor migration is not massive. Estimates of the number of emigrants working abroad include 14 million in 1975 (152) and 20 million in 1980 (635) (see Table 3). In addition, family members may accompany or join workers; in Europe and the Middle East there are as many dependents as workers (76, 662). Almost half of the workers move between developing countries. Most of the remainder migrate from developing countries to developed countries (see map, this page). Despite the relatively small numbers involved, international labor migration has attracted much attention for several reasons:

- The numbers in certain areas are substantial; in some Arab oil-producing countries two-thirds or more of the labor force consists of foreign workers, while in some Caribbean countries as many as 50 percent of young males have left at one time or another.
- Where immigrants enter legally, migration is well documented, and so its extent is obvious.
- Illegal migration causes concern because it is uncontrolled.
- Foreigners tend to be resented because of potential economic competition, fear of intermarriage, and cultural differences. These fears may grow in proportion to the number of aliens.

Thus international migration has the potential for creating political problems between the governments of the sending and the receiving nations.

**Western Europe**

In seven countries of Western Europe, immigrant workers from Southern Europe and North Africa numbered over 5.9 million in 1974 (see Table 3). With their dependents, they numbered over 10 million in 1978 (634). They make up a substantial portion of the total work force in some countries, ranging from 7 percent in France to one-third in

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**Major International Labor Migration Flows of the Past 20 Years**

![Map of Major International Labor Migration Flows](image)

Note: All flows are continuing at substantial levels except flows into Europe, Ghana, and Nigeria.

POPULATION REPORTS
Studying Migration: Problems of Definitions and Data

The study of migration currently lags behind the study of fertility and mortality for several reasons:
- Definitions are difficult and inconsistent.
- Aggregate statistics derived from censuses, population registers, and border controls rarely contain detailed or accurate migration data.
- Data collected for other purposes, as in housing surveys, provide limited migration information.
- Data collection neglects out-migration and emigration.

Definitions

Birth and death are sharply defined, easily recognized events that happen only once to each individual. Migration is not. The spectrum of human mobility is broad, ranging from permanent emigration to a foreign country, to a move to a nearby city, to a daily commute to work (467). Researchers distinguish migration from other kinds of mobility on the basis of arbitrary standards of duration and distance (213, 576, 621). Duration may be measured in terms of actual or intended length of stay. Minimums range from 24 hours to one year or more (549, 576). Migrants may be classified as permanent, temporary, or circulatory (making repeated short trips from home) (108, 576). Distance is not usually measured directly. Instead it often is defined by the crossing of an administrative or political boundary. Generally, the terms in-migration and out-migration are used to describe internal migration; immigration and emigration describe international migration.

Because definitions of migration are both arbitrary and political, migration statistics from different countries or sources are generally not comparable (4, 262, 307, 632). Thus, in 1975 Canada officially recorded 101,564 new immigrants according to national definitions, but by UN standards there were 141,328 (307). As for internal migration, the smaller the administrative unit, the greater is the measured rate of migration (549, 576). Even data from a series of censuses within a country may not be comparable if, as in India, definitions of migration are changed (109).

Statistics on rural-to-urban migration have the additional problem of defining “urban.” Depending on the country, urban areas may be defined as places with: (1) a minimum number of inhabitants, ranging from 100 (Uganda) to 2,500 (Mexico) to 10,000 (Malaysia); (2) urban characteristics such as a nonagricultural economy or electricity (as in Zaire and Bangladesh); or (3) a certain administrative status (as in Brazil and Egypt) (629).

Sources of Data

Censuses are the most common source of migration data. Even if the census does not include a direct question about migration, net migration between censuses can be calculated from the differences between population growth and natural increase (47, 621). Many censuses, however, do include one or more direct questions about migration, including place of birth, duration of current residence, and residence at a certain time in the past (6, 549). Each question captures slightly different information and yields different estimates of migration (621, 689). In general, censuses underestimate migration because they collect data on only two or three places of residence for each individual (180) and may miss illegal immigrants (138).

Population registers, which record all changes in residence as they occur, are in theory the best source of migration data. Few countries maintain accurate registers, however, and even fewer tabulate and publish migration statistics based on them (47, 262, 621, 689). Border statistics provide important information on international migration, since most governments routinely collect some information on foreigners crossing their borders (549, 632). These statistics would-be immigrants who pose as tourists or students or who cross the border surreptitiously (262, 632). Also, where workers cross borders often, they may be counted more than once.

Surveys can gather the most detailed information about individual migration histories and socioeconomic characteristics (74, 213, 262). Much research, however, must rely on the limited migration information generated by surveys with some other purpose, such as studying fertility or housing (213). Few surveys collect complete data on migrants before and after the move, and, for comparison, on nonmigrants in places of origin and destination (74).

All four sources of data — censuses, registers, border statistics, and surveys — neglect out-migration and emigration. Censuses count people according to where they are at the time of the census rather than where they were before, so special tabulations are needed to measure out-migration. For political reasons, population registers and border statistics are far more rigorous in recording immigration than emigration (477, 549).

Partly as a result of this problem, the Economic Commission for Europe in 1972 reported 57 percent more immigrants than emigrants among the member countries (632). Even surveys may miss whole emigrant households if no relatives stay behind (74, 213, 262).

Prospects

Some progress is being made toward better data collection and analysis. The International Labor Organisation (ILO), the International Statistical Institute (ISI), the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSUPP), and the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) have been studying migration survey methods (6, 74, 180, 639, 644). The Economic Commission for Europe is planning a regional information system and policy-oriented analysis (84). Many countries have added questions on migration to their census schedules (6, 109), and the United Nations has recommended standardized definitions for categories of international migrants (631). At the same time, advances in computer technology permit more detailed analysis of census data (689). Currently, however, the study of migration relies on fairly weak and incomplete empirical evidence (700).
Luxembourg. Conversely, the emigration of these workers has reduced the work force in some of the Mediterranean countries they left by 4 to 11 percent (628) — not necessarily a harmful effect, since unemployment is high in these countries.

Middle East

The flow of labor immigrants to Western Europe peaked in the early 1970s and then declined. At the same time, higher oil prices stimulated new migration streams in the Middle East. By 1980 there were about 2.7 million migrant workers in the oil-producing Persian Gulf nations, the largest number of them in Saudi Arabia (76, 628) (see Table 3). At first most of the immigrants came from other Arab countries, but by 1980 almost 30 percent came from Asian countries — chiefly Pakistan and India as well as Malaysia, the Philippines, and South Korea (628). Because many of the Arab countries — both senders and receivers — have relatively small populations, migration has had great demographic and economic impact (628). Some sending countries, such as Jordan, have suffered from shortages of skilled workers, while receiving countries have grown dependent on foreign workers, who make up one-quarter to one-half of the population and an even greater percentage of the labor force (76, 124).

Africa

In sub-Saharan Africa there are two major patterns of international labor migration. One is in West Africa, where in nine countries about 2.8 million people lived outside their country of birth in 1975 (693). Long-distance migration in West Africa has a lengthy history, beginning with the movement of entire villages or clans to avoid war or famine. Later, colonists brought laborers, often by force, to Ghana and the Ivory Coast. Now unequal job opportunities within the region, drought, and the open-border policies of most countries sustain voluntary migration (366, 693). Moreover, with birthrates now above 45 per 1,000 in all West Africa, the number of migrants is likely to grow. Return migration and circulation among countries is common.

Most of the migrants come from rural areas and the lower-income, land-locked countries such as Upper Volta and Mali. In 1975 as much as 17 percent of the population of Upper Volta was living elsewhere (693). The destinations of the migrants have changed over the last three decades, depending on the relative prosperity of the coastal nations and on their immigration policies. Ghana, the most popular destination in the late 1950s and early 1960s, gave way to the Ivory Coast and Nigeria after the Ghanaian economy deteriorated and, in 1969, the government expelled all aliens without residence permits (693). In 1983 there was a similar expulsion from Nigeria (122, 166).

The other, much smaller labor migration flow in sub-Saharan Africa is into South Africa. For nearly a century mines in South Africa have recruited workers on short-term contracts from neighboring countries. The flow of international migrants amounts to about 250,000 per year, and recently the number has remained fairly constant (628). The origin of the migrants has changed, however, with fewer coming from Malawi and Mozambique and more from Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland (158).

Western Hemisphere

In the Western Hemisphere labor migrants, many of them illegal, go chiefly to the US, Argentina, and Venezuela. The US receives more immigrants for permanent settlement than any other country. In the 1970s legal immigrants averaged 425,000 annually, excluding refugees. In addition, there may be some three to six million illegal immigrants currently living in the US (305, 414, 665, 670). Probably half or more of the illegal immigrants — guessed to be 500,000 annually — come from Mexico, with most of the

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**Table 3. Estimated Number of Foreign Workers and Percentage of Work Force that is Foreign in Major Labor-Receiving Countries and Regions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labor-Receiving Countries and Regions &amp; Ref. No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Foreign Workers (in 1,000s)</th>
<th>% of Work Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina (80, 286, 381)</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1,370</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast (690)</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>719</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East (628)</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria (2, 121)</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1,000-2,000</td>
<td>3-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore (42)</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa (2, 600, 626, 670)</td>
<td>1977-83</td>
<td>240-400</td>
<td>3-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States (261, 414, 665, 670)</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>3,000-6,000</td>
<td>3-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela (2, 648, 670)</td>
<td>1981-83</td>
<td>1,000-2,000</td>
<td>20-40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe (623)</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>3,928</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates

* Ranges are rough estimates because of large volume of illegal immigration.

* Austria, Belgium, France, Fed. Rep. of Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland


Urbanization is further advanced in some areas of the world than others. Currently Asia and Africa are less than one-third urban, while other regions are about two-thirds urban or more. Latin America is almost as urban as North America and Europe.
remainder coming from other Latin American and Caribbean countries (414).

In Latin America, Argentina and Brazil for many years attracted immigrants from Europe, especially Italy. More recently, particularly between 1960 and 1970, large numbers of immigrants have come to the Buenos Aires area in Argentina from the surrounding countries of Bolivia, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Chile (294).

In Venezuela oil has spurred migration. The majority of the international migrants come from Colombia and work in agriculture, where they replace native Venezuelans who have migrated to Caracas, the capital, or who have gone to work in the oil industry (294). Between 1960 and 1970 there were an estimated one million illegal border crossings into Venezuela, and in the early 1970s perhaps half a million illegal immigrants lived in the country (536).

The small, English-speaking countries of the Caribbean have experienced some of the heaviest emigration in the world. In some cases 50 percent or more of the males born between 1931 and 1945 left the islands between 1950 and 1970. Emigration slowed during the 1970s and many migrants returned, but between 1970 and 1980 net emigration of 10 percent of the 1970 population was typical (72). These emigrants have traditionally gone to developed countries. Recently more movement has been within the region, from countries with poorer economic situations, such as Haiti, to those that are better off, such as the Bahamas and the US Virgin Islands.

**DETERMINANTS OF MIGRATION**

The main reason people migrate is to find better jobs and higher wages, as shown by both economic analyses and surveys of migrants. At the same time, the distance to potential destinations and the quality and quantity of information about them help to shape migration decisions. Migrants tend to be young and better educated, in part because of a desire to establish their independence and in part because young, better educated people can best take advantage of the opportunities offered by migration. In Africa and much of Asia, most migrants are men; in Latin America and parts of East Asia, women predominate.

**Jobs and Income**

It is now generally thought that migrants move chiefly in search of higher earnings. The economic interpretation of migration developed in the 1960s out of growing concern among policy makers and planners about the relationships among population growth, urbanization, and development (649). In 1964 Simon Kuznets outlined, largely on the basis of US experience, how economic growth and development could lead to migration:

- Technological advances change what people buy and so change the demand for workers in different jobs.
- Employers often choose to locate in cities because they want easy access to raw materials, communication and transportation, and consumer markets. Thus many new jobs are created in cities, even if workers must migrate from the countryside to fill them.

In the early 1960s the “human capital” school of economics cast migration in terms of “an investment increasing the productivity of human resources” (563). In deciding whether to migrate, individuals weigh the costs of this...
investment against its returns. The costs consist of future earnings at home that the migrant gives up and the expenses of moving, both financial and psychic. The returns consist of the migrant's future earnings in the area of destination (563).

By 1970, extending this view, Michael Todaro and John Harris had proposed that rates of rural-to-urban migration depend on (1) the differences in wages or earnings between areas of destination and origin and (2) the chances of finding a job at the destination (252, 610). Much of the empirical economic research on migration in recent years has sought to test this hypothesis using aggregate data on regions within a developing country. Results have been mixed. The study that tested Todaro's model most thoroughly used data from Tanzania. Its findings supported the model: the rate of rural-to-urban migration was higher where there was a greater difference between rural wages, on one hand, and urban wages multiplied by the probability of finding an urban job, on the other (55). Other studies have similarly linked migration rates with wages as modified by unemployment rates in destination areas (55, 273), with regional differences in wages or earnings (45, 55, 217), or with regional differences in unemployment rates (45).

Most studies, however, have not looked at wage (or income) differentials to explain migration, but rather have studied wages in the destination and origin areas separately. Generally, destination areas with high wages have high in-migration rates (55, 59, 99, 200, 227, 228, 346, 528). In the case of origin areas, however, results are inconsistent: high rates of out-migration are sometimes linked with lower incomes (59, 227, 346, 528, 541) and sometimes with higher incomes (45, 200, 226, 228). Wage levels probably make more difference in stimulating migration than unemployment rates. Generally, lower unemployment levels in destination areas and higher unemployment levels in origin areas are linked with higher migration rates (320, 346), but not always significantly (99, 200, 228, 320).

In a new economic approach, Oded Stark has suggested that the motivation to migrate stems not only from a comparison of wages at the origin and destination, but also from a comparison of personal income with overall village income levels. Below-average earners feel relatively deprived and move in order to increase their incomes. After the move, the migrants continue to measure themselves against the village standard and so feel that they have made an improvement (584).

It could be expected that higher fertility in rural than urban areas — and thus faster growth in labor supply — would contribute to migration. Other things being equal, the more workers, the lower their wages, and thus the greater the difference between rural and urban wages, leading to more migration. This has been confirmed with population data in at least one study. T. Paul Schultz, examining 1951 Colombian data, found that the faster the population grew in a rural area, the faster the young people left. A 10 percent difference in the population growth rate accounted for a 25 percent difference in the out-migration rate among those under age 26, he estimated (541).

Rapid population growth may stimulate rural-to-urban migration even if fertility is the same in both areas. As population grows, productivity is thought to drop faster in rural areas than in urban areas. This is because rural productivity is closely tied to the availability of land, which is limited. The faster drop in rural productivity means that the difference between rural and urban earnings widens, thus accelerating migration to the cities (629).

Evidence on this hypothesis is conflicting. Studies in the Andes, Kenya, Turkey, Pakistan, and the Cook Islands have found higher rates of out-migration from villages or areas with less land per person, but the results of other studies disagree (114, 320). The studies are inconclusive partly because they fail to take into account the effect of past out-migration on current man/land ratios and the varying quality as well as quantity of the land (114). In addition, where land is still plentiful, the relationship between migration and changing man/land ratios would be weak.

Studies of rural villages have noted that there are sometimes two out-migration flows — one to towns and cities, the other to other rural areas (110, 114, 197, 604). Migrants who are richer, better educated, and more ambitious may be more likely to go to the city to school or to find a job. They are more likely to travel longer distances for higher wages. The relatively poor and uneducated tend to go to most migrants move because they want to make more money. Even low-level urban factory jobs, such as collating pages at a printing plant in Colombia (left), usually provide higher income than farm work, such as planting groundnuts in Nigeria (right). (World Bank/Y. Hadar, US AID).
nearby rural destinations, often looking for other agricultural work. The very poorest rarely migrate, since they cannot afford to travel or to support themselves while looking for a job (114, 128, 466, 551). The two flows of migrants have been called "pull" migrants and "push" migrants, using the terminology of Everett Lee (343). "Pull" migrants are said to be attracted by opportunities at their destination. "Push" migrants are said to be fleeing poor conditions at home. Some economists are critical of the terms "push" and "pull," however, because they think that wage differentials between areas, not conditions in either area alone, are decisive.

Studies of villages also find that rates of out-migration are higher where land holding is inequitable and a few people own most of the land (114, 168, 666). This may be because inequality creates the social classes most likely to move: failing farmers and landless laborers are pushed out, while the educated sons of better-off farmers are pulled out (114).

Recently, a number of researchers have emphasized the importance of the rural family, rather than the individual migrant, in making migration decisions (114, 133, 249, 583, 585). From the household's point of view, there are two reasons to send one of its members to the city or abroad. Both involve remittances sent back by the migrant: (1) to obtain money needed to invest in agricultural technology and so improve farm earnings and (2) to gain an additional source of income that does not face the same risks as agriculture (421, 492, 582, 583, 586). In the parched Sahel region of Africa, for example, a migrant child is the only

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region, Country, &amp; Ref. No.</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% of Male Migrants Citing Reason</th>
<th>% of Female Migrants Citing Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Work</td>
<td>Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFRICA</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ghana (20)</td>
<td>328 male and 126 female migrants from Asutsuare area</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigeria (165)</td>
<td>545 male and 358 female short-term migrants, mainly to urban areas</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone (94)</td>
<td>3,806 male and 3,347 female migrants to Greater Freetown</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bangladesh (487)</td>
<td>Migrants into Teknaf thana</td>
<td>72</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indonesia (134)</td>
<td>Rural-to-urban migrants in Java</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea, Rep. of (281)</td>
<td>214 male and 394 female migrants to Seoul</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thailand (606)</td>
<td>31,675 male and 36,030 female migrants to Bangkok metropolis</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>LATIN AMERICA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chile (157)</td>
<td>484 male and 596 female migrants to Greater Santiago between 1942 and 1962</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica (64)</td>
<td>91 male and 99 female migrants to San José metropolitan area</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexico (279)</td>
<td>48 male and 40 female migrants from a Yucatan village, mainly to urban areas</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela (111)</td>
<td>Migrants to Caracas between 1958 and 1967</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIDDLE EAST &amp; NORTH AFRICA</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Algeria (246)</td>
<td>108,889 male and 150,147 female migrants from rural areas between 1966 and 1969</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt (298)</td>
<td>12,020 male and 4,938 female migrants to urban areas</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes 5 percent with combined motive of work and family

b Includes 3 percent with combined motive of work and family.
drought-proof family investment possible (91). In Mexico migration to the US, while risky in itself, produces a large cash income and diversifies the family's income, thus reducing the risks of total dependence on agriculture (512).

In the last several years the study of migration has shifted and broadened its emphasis. Researchers are paying more attention to rural, rather than urban, economic factors as causes of migration. Furthermore, it is clearer that motives for migration, as well as patterns of migration, differ depending on the historical course of development (552, 649). At the same time, the emphasis on using aggregate data to test models of individual decision-making is being questioned. On one hand, sociologists and anthropologists are playing a larger role in migration research, with new emphasis on communities and households (74, 135, 179). On the other hand, some economists are urging more attention to the basic economic structures of a country and particularly to the changing relationships between the agricultural sector, the industrial urban sector, and the informal urban sector where many migrants first find work. These relationships, it is argued, are more readily influenced by government policy than are employment conditions themselves (208, 700).

**Migrants' Reasons for Moving**

While researchers debate where the emphasis of their analyses should lie, migrants themselves confirm that the search for a better job is an important reason for moving to the city. In surveys of male migrants from over a dozen countries, 55 to 85 percent mention work as the major reason for their moves (see Table 4). A desire for a better education accounts for a substantial minority of the moves. Family reasons — joining or accompanying relatives — also are important. Younger migrants are more likely to move for educational or family reasons, while older migrants more often move to find jobs (509, 519). Urban amenities — entertainment, electricity, and other services — are sometimes mentioned but are not primary reasons (45, 88, 91, 375).

The reasons women give for migrating reveal a different pattern from men's reasons, reflecting social constraints on women's mobility and work (605, 686). In general, work and school are less important and family reasons more important than for men, but there are dramatic variations from one country to another (686). In India, Egypt, Sudan, and Upper Volta, marriage and other family considerations account for over 80 percent of women's moves (120, 298, 439, 479). By contrast, in Thailand, Botswana, Mexico, and Nicaragua, economic reasons are at least as important as family reasons (60, 88, 279, 606). Evidence from Africa suggests that women play down the economic reasons for moving in order to conform to social expectations (686). Wherever large proportions of urban women work — in Latin America, West Africa, and Southeast Asia — economic motives for female migration are probably important (605).

**Distance**

Many studies show that distance deters migration (91, 128, 163, 505). Analyses of regional data find that distance often accounts for much of the variation in migration rates, sometimes for almost as much as earnings (59, 227, 228, 346, 563). People are more likely to migrate a short distance than a long distance because it costs less and because they know more about opportunities in nearby places (198, 509). This is especially true of low-income and less well-educated migrants (509). In addition, long-distance travel is more difficult for the traveler, and far-away places differ more from home. Thus distance may represent the psychic, nonmonetary costs of migration as well as the monetary costs.

Even for the poorest groups, however, modern transportation has significantly reduced the costs of migration and weakened the deterrent effect of distance. The Frafras of northeastern Ghana who migrated in the 1930s had to walk for two or three weeks to cover the 330 miles to the city of Kumasi. In the 1970s they could travel the 500 miles to Accra in a single day by bus or truck for the relatively small sum of £2 (UK) (253). The availability of transportation has been shown to affect migration patterns in Colombia, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and Thailand (110, 128, 378, 569, 619).

International migration often involves the greatest distances and the heaviest costs. Thus international migrants tend to be better educated, higher-income, older, and have more valuable job skills than internal migrants in the same country (114, 143). In addition to travel costs, the legal barriers to international migration and the assistance required make international migration more difficult (330, 343).

**Information**

Would-be migrants base their decisions on whatever they can learn about the costs and returns of moving. In developing countries people rely heavily on their relatives and friends living in other places for information about possible destinations (114, 219). Also, gifts and visits from obviously prosperous migrants demonstrate the rewards of life elsewhere (181). Conversely, people are unlikely to move to places that they know little about.

In part because the ties of kinship and friendship channel information and aid, and in part because of a natural attachment to relatives and friends, migrants from the same place of origin tend to move to the same destination (31, 90, 197, 278, 279). This phenomenon is termed chain migration. For example, in the Philippines, migrants from one town have moved to the southwestern part of Minda-
Chain migration may help to determine the rate as well as the direction of a stream of migrants (701). The rate of immigration suddenly rises when the size of the settled migrant community reaches a certain threshold. At that point much information flows between the destination and source areas and there is plenty of help for new arrivals, so the psychological barriers to migration weaken (551). Recently, a detailed analysis of rural-to-urban migration in Mexico found that the strongest reason for differing rates of migration to various cities was the different sizes of the migrant communities already there (550).

The mass media may make migration easier and more appealing. They have made villagers aware that conditions are better in the cities and in developed countries (290). A survey of Venezuelan high school students found that radio and newspapers had more influence on residential preferences than either students' own experiences in different cities or family contacts (295). In a Thai study only two socioeconomic variables in the areas of origin were significantly associated with rates of migration to Bangkok — the percentage of households with television sets and the number of trains to Bangkok daily (569).

Who Migrates?

The reasons for migrating, its costs, and its opportunities are reflected in the characteristics of migrants. Thus the tendency to migrate is related to age, sex, education, and ethnic group. Young adults age 15 to 35 are most likely to migrate (15, 17, 64, 120, 157, 214, 279, 313, 439, 620, 642, 688, 691) (see Figure 4). Young adults have fewer personal ties or responsibilities and more years to enjoy the returns from migration (181, 486, 519).

In Africa and much of Asia men predominate in both rural-to-urban and international migration flows, while women marrying often form the majority of short-distance, rural-to-rural migrants (15, 114, 120, 165, 479, 688). Recently, however, more women in Africa and South Asia are joining their husbands in town or independently migrating to cities to find jobs (15, 88, 156, 272, 351, 479).

By contrast, in Latin America and some East Asian countries, such as the Philippines, the majority of rural-to-urban migrants are women (99, 114, 157, 451, 470, 641, 686). They are responding to opportunities for jobs such as domestic service and factory work (44, 164, 291, 451, 566). In rural-to-rural migration in these countries, men looking for agricultural work may predominate. In Chile in 1970 the sex ratio among recent migrants to Santiago was 74 men per 100 women, while among recent migrants to rural areas it was 154 (266).

Rural-to-urban migrants are on average better educated than those who stay behind (17, 163, 181, 279, 439, 603, 688). In a study of 16 north Indian villages, for example, 49 percent of the adult out-migrants had some formal education compared with only 14 percent of other adult villagers of comparable age (114). Better educated people are more aware of outside opportunities and may have learned urban values. They also are likely to benefit more from moving. Schools teach skills that are useful in obtaining urban jobs, and the difference between rural and urban wages is greatest for the better educated (96, 114, 406, 557).

Members of some ethnic groups are more likely to migrate than others (120, 320, 467, 620). Groups with high migration rates include the Serbs in Yugoslavia, the Low Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, and the Kikuyu in Kenya (260, 272, 642). Where migration has been common in the past, young people are aware of opportunities outside the village and have contacts to help them in their move (278). In some cultures, in countries as diverse as Peru, Liberia, and Indonesia, migration is a normal, even mandatory part of a young person's life (114, 278). In contrast, traditional au-

![Rural schools, such as this one in Liberia, teach children the skills needed to get an urban job and so profit from migration. Most migrants are better educated than nonmigrants. (US AID)](image-url)
The age and sex distribution of urban nonmigrants is typical of developing-country populations with high fertility: it forms a pyramid with a broad base, indicating a high proportion of children. By contrast, most migrants are people of working ages, so their distribution is more diamond-shaped. Also, more of the migrants may be of one sex or the other, depending on the city jobs available. In Jakarta, Indonesia, as in much of Asia, men and women migrate in approximately equal numbers. In Africa most migrants are men, as shown in Freetown, Sierra Leone. In the typical Latin American pattern, shown in Asunción, Paraguay, most of the migrants are women.

The age and sex distribution of migrant and native populations in three cities:

**Jakarta, Indonesia, 1971**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Migrants</th>
<th>Natives</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>10%</td>
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<td>5-9</td>
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<td>60-64</td>
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<td>65+</td>
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**Greater Freetown, Sierra Leone, 1975**

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<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Migrants</th>
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**Asunción, Paraguay, 1972**

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<tr>
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<th>Migrants</th>
<th>Natives</th>
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<td>65+</td>
<td>15%</td>
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</table>

Note: Migrants 1966-1971

Sources: Jakarta—Hugo (275); Greater Freetown—Okoye (447); Asunción—Noordam (433).

Most rural-to-urban and international labor migrants benefit from their moves and are satisfied with their new lives. The economic rewards often are greater for international migrants than for rural-to-urban migrants, but so are the cultural changes and the disruption in family life. Migrant communities in the destination area help new migrants adapt to their surroundings, thus easing the transition. For various reasons, the fertility of rural-to-urban migrants tends to be lower than fertility in their rural area of origin.

**CONSEQUENCES OF MIGRATION FOR THE INDIVIDUAL**

Most rural-to-urban migrants are glad that they moved (64, 87, 181, 283, 335). They believe that their living conditions have improved (335, 359), that they are making progress (359), and that their children are better off (64, 377). A substantial minority, however, are dissatisfied with city life (181, 313, 375, 655) and may return or move on (314, 383, 688).

Migrants rely on the traditional kinship system and an ethnic identity to help them during the transition to life in the city (145, 359, 575). On arrival, they often live with a relative or close friend who gives them meals, assistance with the job search, information about urban life, and moral support (26, 90, 359, 362, 375, 608). As a result, migrants usually get a job in the same trade as their immediate connections (254, 362) and cluster in neighborhoods with other migrants from their native place (197, 237, 277, 359, 362, 375, 608). These migrant neighborhoods act as a transitional zone between rural and urban environments (16, 282, 359, 377, 474).

Most migrants find jobs quickly and easily because they will accept poorly paid and physically demanding jobs. These jobs typically have a high rate of turnover and are easy to get (277, 297, 364, 516). The unemployment rate among migrants is usually around 5 to 10 percent (64, 157, 161, 439, 516, 655). It decreases the longer migrants remain in the city (88, 99, 439). In fact, unemployment rates often are lower among migrants than among urban natives (64, 157, 257, 323, 360) (see Table 5).

Migrants commonly find their first jobs in the informal sector; that is, they are self-employed or work for small family businesses (323, 361, 559). Typical migrant jobs include street vending, construction, crafts (64, 88, 216, 376, 456, 615, 655), and, for women, domestic service (44, 313, 452) (see Table 5). In most of these jobs the work is intermittent (313, 362, 575), and income varies from one day to the next (456).

While these may be low-level jobs by urban standards, moving increases the income and improves the occupational status of most migrants (99, 106, 323, 397, 443, 456, 615). In Turkey, for example, 76 percent of all urban immigrants earned more after they moved than before; 12 percent earned the same amount; and only 10 percent earned less (161). Still, migrants tend to earn less than the authorities in other groups, such as the Maasai of Kenya, discourage movement outside the tribe and consider urban material wealth irrelevant to success (272, 278, 368).
natives (157, 658), especially at first (277, 439, 516, 615, 658), although when age, sex, education, and occupational skills are accounted for, little difference in wages remains (225, 323, 439, 516, 615). Perhaps because of the relative improvement in their earnings — as well as a rural heritage of political inactivity — migrants have tended to be politically conservative and inactive (103, 117, 118, 426, 489, 678).

For international migrants, the economic improvements may be even greater than for rural-to-urban migrants, since the difference in wages and living standards is often greater between countries than between rural and urban areas of the same country. The adaptation process may be more difficult, however, since the cultural and social gap between home and destination also is wider. Language differences, separation of families, religious and racial discrimination, and an uncertain legal status can make assimilation difficult (237, 270, 394, 524). Temporary migrants may not want to adapt to the new country, and instead they may recreate their native social organization in different surroundings (333).

Fertility

Rural fertility is usually greater than urban fertility, often by a substantial margin (see Table 6). For the most part, the fertility of rural-to-urban migrants falls between rural and urban rates. In some cases, the fertility of migrants is as low as that of native city-dwellers (153, 157, 342, 501, 542, 674, 694, 702).

Three explanations of relatively low migrant fertility have been proposed:

- Selectivity: Migrants may be a self-selected group that would have had lower fertility than their rural neighbors even if they had not migrated (210, 342, 501). This could be because willingness to migrate and desire...
for a small family both reflect a tendency toward more modern, less traditional attitudes.

- **Adaptation**: After they move, migrants may quickly adapt to new surroundings and adopt attitudes and behavior, including lower fertility, that are like those of other urbanites and that suit city life (215, 342, 385, 501).

- **Disruption**: Moving itself may lower fertility by delaying marriages, separating spouses, reducing the desire for an immediate pregnancy, and creating stresses that perhaps disrupt the functioning of the reproductive system (211, 212, 215, 661, 702).

These differing explanations of migrant fertility have different implications for future population growth in developing countries. To the extent that selection is at work, rural-to-urban migration may have little effect on national fertility rates, since the migrants would have had fewer children even if they had never moved. Migration could, however, widen the gap between urban and rural fertility (271, 501). In contrast, adaptation might lower national fertility rates as urbanization takes place (250, 699). For example, Bun Song Lee and colleagues have estimated that in South Korea rural-to-urban migration will avert 2.6 million births among the 1965-75 cohort of migrants (342).

All three factors probably influence migrant fertility, with one or another dominating in particular settings or families (48, 212, 269). A study in Ghana showed the effects of both selection and adaptation. Migrants had lower fertility than rural nonmigrants before they moved, but the migrants' fertility fell still further after they moved and came close to that of urban natives (41). A South Korean study, which also found both adaptation and selection at work, focused on the adaptation effect. The rate of childbearing among rural-to-urban migrants, relative to that among rural nonmigrants, fell after their move. The fertility of migrant women was lower the longer they had lived in the city and the larger the city (342). A similar study in Mexico found that a migrant who spent all her reproductive years in the city would bear 1.45 fewer children than a comparable woman who stayed in the countryside (341). In Mexico birth-spacing patterns showed evidence of disruption as well as selection and adaptation. At every parity level, the interval between births was longer when the mothers had migrated during that interval (212).

Many other studies have tried to evaluate these three factors by comparing migrant fertility with the fertility of urban natives or rural nonmigrants (23, 68, 181, 210, 244, 264, 269, 317, 370, 385, 407, 424, 444, 457, 491, 501, 511). Results are inconclusive, however, because the studies are cross-sectional, and thus cannot examine trends, and because they cannot link individuals’ migration and reproductive histories over time (694).

In some areas, especially in Africa, rural-to-urban migration and urbanization have been linked to a short-term
rise in fertility rates because of the shorter duration of breastfeeding and postpartum abstinence in urban than in rural areas (93, 173, 422, 521). The evidence on rural-to-urban migration is scanty. In Jordan, Pakistan, and Thailand, the duration of breastfeeding among migrants was intermediate to that among rural and urban nonmigrants (32, 318, 545). Migrants to Ibadan, Nigeria, practiced postpartum abstinence for 1.2 months less than urban natives (92). By contrast, a study in Lagos, Nigeria, found that neither migrant status nor duration of residence was significant in explaining the length of breastfeeding or postpartum abstinence among city residents. Education was the key factor (345).

There has been little research about what happens to fertility in areas of out-migration. When migration drastically imbalances sex ratios, as has occurred in Barbados, for example, it lowers fertility by reducing the likelihood of marriage (114, 379, 423, 709). When married men migrate, leaving their wives behind, marital fertility also falls because of the lower frequency of coitus (183, 275, 420). In Varanasi, India, the total marital fertility rate for couples separated by migration for 9 to 11 months each year was 6.4, compared with 7.5 for couples who stayed together at home (561). The disruption posed by physical separation may be supplemented by the adoption of more modern ideas, introduced when the migrants return, that favor small families and contraceptive use (183), or by upward social mobility brought about by migration (386). It has been hypothesized, alternatively, that where migrants are young people who send money home, couples who remained might want more children who could eventually migrate and provide different sources of income (579, 580, 602).

**CONSEQUENCES OF RURAL-TO-URBAN MIGRATION**

For the individual migrant, the net benefits of migration are considerable. But what are the results in:
- the areas migrants leave?
- the areas where migrants settle?
- the country as a whole?

The consequences for rural areas vary from place to place, depending on the nature of the local economy and the size of the migration stream. Most, however, gain more than they lose from out-migration. Population pressure and unemployment are reduced, while remittances from migrants increase the standard of living. Labor shortages do occur in some areas, and remittances may not be as productively invested as possible, but the situation would undoubtedly have been worse if there had been no out-migration.

The picture is less clear for the cities and the nation as a whole. Is rural-to-urban migration necessary for economic growth? Or is it a cause of increasing unemployment, urban congestion and inefficiency, and an imbalance in national development? The evidence is scanty and inconclusive, but increasingly researchers agree that the answer depends on the specific economic situation and migration patterns of each country (1, 552, 637).

**Rural, Sending Areas**

For rural areas, the consequences of internal and international migration are similar. They result from the departure of people, mostly young adults of working and child-bearing age, and the influx of money in the form of remittances from the migrants. While the following discussion focuses on the economic consequences of these movements, there are also profound social effects, such as the disruption of family structures.

**Population growth.** In the long term, out-migration offsets natural increase and so theoretically may slow, stop, or even reverse population growth, depending on how many leave and on their age and sex (310). In practice, high fertility in developing countries today generally overpowers migration, and rural populations continue to grow. Currently, net population losses are unusual even in areas of substantial out-migration, although they have been reported in some rural areas of Latin America and Asia (119, 230). Out-migration has, however, kept rural rates of population growth in developing regions well below rural rates of natural increase (233). (See Table 1, p. M-248.)

**Labor force and agricultural production.** In the short run, the exodus from rural areas immediately reduces population size and thus the pressure on the land (232, 482, 522). At the same time, it shrinks the labor force and increases the dependency ratio (the number of economically unproductive people for each productive person), since migrants tend to be young adults (35, 98, 275, 412, 692). The economic impact of this movement out of rural areas varies, depending on the number of migrants and the extent of underemployment. Where underemployment is widespread, the absence of up to one-quarter or even one-half of the labor force may not reduce agricultural production (54, 113, 620). In this situation, the productivity of the labor left behind rises, whereas the productivity of the land remains the same or diminishes slightly.

Even when out-migration creates real labor shortages, many rural families adapt successfully (127, 554). Migrants may regularly return home to help during peak agricultural seasons (144, 158, 277). Women and children may take on more of the agricultural work (105, 238, 277, 686). Remittances from the out-migrants may be used to hire extra labor or purchase machinery and so reduce the need for labor (113, 114, 144, 163, 512). Farmers may switch to less labor-intensive crops (529, 562). These adaptations, however, do not suit every situation and cannot always prevent a drop in agricultural production (149, 522, 602). Hired labor may be unavailable or too expensive, for example. Thus, in some areas farmland lies idle (434, 452, 522, 602). Because of labor shortages in Oman, less winter wheat is sown; date palms are neglected, so the yield drops; and the irrigation system is poorly maintained, so crops are more vulnerable to drought (76, 562).

When men migrate alone (a pattern typical of Africa and parts of Asia), their wives take on their husbands' farm work in addition to their own and become responsible for managing the household. The women make day-to-day decisions about agricultural and family matters (105, 527, 686). In the long term, continued male out-migration may change the role of women by expanding their activities and responsibilities.
Women work in the fields in Kenya. Labor shortages in agriculture, caused by male out-migration, may mean more work for the women left behind or changes in farm production. (US AID)

Remittances. Migrants everywhere send money home to their immediate relatives and carry back gifts and savings when they return or visit (90, 114, 277). Commonly, as many as 60 to 90 percent of migrants remit money (26, 90, 277, 293, 444). The closer that migrants’ ties are to the home community and the more established they are in their work, the more likely they are to send remittances (114, 319, 338, 442, 468, 493, 523). Families at home may support migrants during their difficult early days, and later, once established, the migrants repay their obligation by sending money back to their families (90, 120, 163, 585). At the community level, the net transfer generally favors the area of origin unless many migrants are students supported by their families (98, 163, 493).

Remittances often constitute a large proportion of the migrant’s and the recipient's incomes (90, 125, 277, 320, 442, 445). Not surprisingly, such large amounts of money substantially improve the recipients’ welfare and standard of living. Diet, clothing, and housing all are upgraded (149, 277, 349, 602). In many communities remittances are the major factor determining which households are more wealthy (36, 176, 356, 372, 415, 560). Remittances can be substantial enough to amount to a major redistribution of income from one geographical area to another. In the late 1960s one-tenth of all income earned in Accra, Ghana, flowed out of the city as remittances, savings, and goods — going chiefly to rural Ghana (90). In most areas the vast majority of remittances and migrant savings are spent on consumption, largely daily living expenses, housing, and other consumer goods (26, 36, 90, 204, 293, 442, 537). According to recipients’ reports, a relatively small percentage is directly invested in agriculture, industry, or commerce (57, 184, 330, 493), although remittances may free other income for investment (582). One reason is that many families rely on remittances for basic needs rather than extra income. Another is that remittance income may ease the pressure to invest in order to earn more at home (83, 158, 349, 415, 482, 498). Alternatively, organized opportunities to invest may be lacking (498). For example, in areas of Pakistan, Yemen, and Yugoslavia that are suitable for irrigation or intensified fruit and vegetable farming, remittances are invested in agriculture. In parts of the same countries lacking such investment opportunities, the money is spent on consumption or is hoarded (57, 349, 602). There is evidence for the investment of remittances in agricultural technology in other countries as well, including Kenya and India (421, 441, 492, 580). Another common expenditure of remittances, on schooling (26, 90, 277, 293, 302), is also an investment of sorts — in the labor force.

Innovation by return migrants. The evidence is mixed concerning return migrants as sources of innovation (207, 601). Out-migrants have had more varied experiences and so may be open to or instigate change (114, 120, 277, 365, 389). Thus in the late 1960s Liberian plantation workers used knowledge and seedlings collected on the job to begin raising cash crops on their own farmlands (144). In the Indian Punjab return migrants were more likely to plant high-yielding varieties of wheat, to use tractors and threshers, and to adopt new agricultural practices (441). Return migrants to Nigeria have not only introduced new crops, but also stimulated the building of village schools and health centers (25).

Many out-migrants, however, either do not learn new work skills while away (13, 14, 90, 207, 452), or they have work experience that is irrelevant at home (90, 570). This is especially true of rural-to-urban migrants, who return to farm after holding nonagricultural jobs in the city.

Urban, Receiving Areas and the Nation

The impact of rural-to-urban migration on the cities has received the most attention, largely because of the high visibility of rapid urban growth. In addition, the cities, as the centers of industry and modernization, are presumed to be closely tied to the development of the nation as a whole. Views on the impact of rural-to-urban migration have shifted over the years, and there is still no consensus about whether it is largely beneficial or largely harmful to economic development.

Population growth and the labor force. Rural-to-urban migration increases rates of population growth in the cities (see p. M-248). In-migrants who have children also contribute to natural increase in the cities and, because they are concentrated in the childbearing ages, raise crude birthrates (310). This is especially true where females form the majority of migrants, as is the case in Latin America and parts of Asia (402, 423).

Since most migrants are young adults, immigration generally adds to the number of 15-to-35 year olds in the place of destination (see Figure 4, p. M-257). The result is an in-
Migrants Speak: From the Women Left Behind

The train is sure not our enemy,
Nor is the ship;
Our real enemy is the job
Which has snatched away our husbands.

The field is lying untilled,
The flower in the earthen pot is rotting inside the home,
The wife is rotting in her father's home
And the husband is rotting away in Calcutta.

As the mango trees are blossoming
And Mahua is blooming,
My heart is burning.
Through whom should I send the message?
O cruel dear, why don't you give up your job?
—an Indian song sung by wives about their migrant husbands (537)

In reality I am a widow. For most of my married life
(15 years), I have lived apart from my husband. I have
worked like a man to feed my family. But that is how
it has always been — I do not see it changing.
—the wife of a migrant in Zimbabwe (8)

If you meet him in South Africa, tell him
That I am naked and his mother is naked.
—from a Malawi song describing the poverty of
women left at home (79)

increase in the percentage of the population active in the
labor force, a decrease in the dependency ratio, and
perhaps even a decrease in the overall mortality rate (160, 312,
354, 657). If migrants settle, however, their impact on the
population ageing (75).

Economic growth and development. Decades of debate
have failed to conclude whether rural-to-urban migration
aids or impedes development in present-day developing
countries and their cities. The relationship among urbanization,
industrialization, and development is complicated,
and conclusive empirical evidence is scarce. Initially,
based on the experience of Europe and North America,
economists viewed migration as a relatively smooth geo-plexed
reallocation of labor in response to economic
growth (see p. M-252) and so saw urbanization as a natural
and beneficial part of development (267, 331, 347, 488,
429). This shift of workers made labor more productive,
thus raising incomes and the national product. Furthermore,
migration was seen as self-limiting, since the shift of
workers from the countryside to the city would eventually
eliminate the geographical difference in wages that had
inspired migration in the first place (331, 398, 399).

This position soon had its critics. They argued that the
developing countries were not following the pattern of
Europe and North America. Urbanization was taking place
faster than urban economic growth could create jobs for
the migrants (192, 234, 235, 391, 609, 673). One fundamen-
tal problem, it has been thought, is political bias in favor of
urban areas — public policy and government spending
that maintain an artificially wide urban-rural difference in
wages and living standards (234, 357, 612). Another cause is
rapid population growth, which is creating potential work-
ers faster than in Europe and North America when those
areas were developing. At the same time, industry is more
mechanized, less labor-intensive, and thus requires fewer
workers (192, 552). Furthermore, migration can be
expected to continue even in the face of high urban unem-
ployment, because the extremely wide difference be-
tween rural and urban wage levels makes it appear
worthwhile for migrants to take a chance on getting a city
job (252, 609). The migrants to the city, it is argued, end up
unemployed or in unproductive informal-sector jobs. In-
rather of contributing to national economic growth, their
presence merely depresses wages and permits economic
exploitation (97, 234, 391).

This “overurbanization” is complicated by a distortion in
the size distribution of the cities within a country, so that
the biggest, or primate, city is disproportionately large (67,
393). These cities absorb more than their share of re-
sources and create a less than optimally efficient eco-

nomic distribution of the factors of production (396, 502,
673, 675). Many of these primate cities are thought to be
becoming less efficient and more costly (235, 440, 502, 673,
678). This negative view of urbanization colored the World
Population Plan of Action adopted at Bucharest in 1974,
which stated:

Urbanization in most countries is characterized by a num-
ber of adverse factors: drain from rural areas through mi-
gination of individuals who cannot be absorbed by produc-
tive employment in urban areas, serious disequilibrium in
the growth of urban centres, contamination of the environ-
ment, inadequate housing and services and social and psy-
chological stress. (682)

Many economists are now criticizing these negative views
and taking a more positive attitude toward migration.
Merely because current migration is not following exactly
the same patterns followed by Europe and the US does not
mean that it is not a valuable part of the development
process (209, 572, 669, 673). In addition, they argue that
migration does not cause substantial unemployment,
since the informal sector in the cities does provide jobs
(see p. M-257) and does contribute to economic growth
(257, 335, 377, 642). Furthermore, economists have shown
that primate cities can be efficient in certain economic

This squatter settlement in Manila has expanded out over the
water. Large cities in developing countries are surrounded by
squatter settlements because there is not enough cheap
housing for the large numbers of in-migrants. (US AID)
settings (396, 495, 546) and have pointed out the lack of evidence for diseconomies of scale or, indeed, for any one 'optimal city size' (38, 400, 404, 503).

As a result, recent views have been shifting back to the idea that rural-to-urban migration and urbanization are, on balance, ultimately beneficial, self-regulating parts of development. This swing back to older arguments is accompanied, however, by a new realization that the relationship between urbanization and development is complex and probably varies from one setting to another (358, 637). In addition, current thought recognizes that urbanization, while beneficial in the long term, may cause problems in the short term. Thus,

Income distribution. It is increasingly argued that greater equity in the distribution of income ought to be used as a measure of a nation's welfare instead of or along with the traditional criterion of economic growth. Opinions conflict concerning whether rural-to-urban migration makes the distribution of income more or less equitable. Macroeconomic models have generally concluded that rural-to-urban migration tends to equalize incomes (22, 30, 516). By contrast, a review of village-level studies by Michael Lipton has concluded that rural out-migration increases economic inequality between the city and the countryside, among rural villages, and among individuals in the same village (356). Major issues being debated include whether remittances redistribute wealth more equitably, whether migration provides lower-income groups with better access to highly paid industrial jobs, whether reduced rural population pressure improves rural incomes, and whether a change in the relative supply of urban and rural goods favors farmers (22, 30, 356, 357, 516). Opinions on these issues often depend largely on theoretical economic assumptions (516), interpretations of statistical measures of inequality, and whether the individual or the family is the unit of analysis (587). In fact, the effect of migration on income distribution, like its effect on economic growth, probably varies from one time and place to the next, depending on the specific economic setting and the patterns of migration (516).

Public services and housing. Rapid city growth, due partly to in-migration and partly to urban natural increase, is difficult to control or accommodate, straining the ability of cities to provide public services (63, 95, 202, 205, 376, 408, 449, 672). Urban areas spend more than rural areas on housing, garbage collection, sewerage, water, transportation, and even education. In part, this is because higher urban labor costs and other costs offset the economies of scale and ease of collection and distribution that are characteristic of cities. In part, large cities need a greater number of public services and more expensive types of service. Cities require piped water and sewerage, organized garbage collection, and police and fire protection, which rural areas often do without. Also, services must be provided to industry, and the city dwellers demand more and higher-quality services (234, 355).

Because of the financial burden, large parts of some cities in developing countries, especially the squatter sections of the cities, still lack electricity, running water, sewer systems, and garbage collection (63, 95, 97, 408, 409, 453, 658). Water sources are often contaminated by sewage and garbage, creating a major public health problem (43, 408, 409, 514, 575). Public transportation also may be inadequate for the growing number of passengers (202, 453, 658).

In housing, the most visible sector, construction cannot keep up with demand (140, 202, 417). In Bangkok, for example, 50,000 to 60,000 new housing units are built each year, but 120,000 are needed (453). Even where homes are available, they are usually too expensive for migrants and even for many well-established city dwellers (408, 618). Migrants cope with the housing problem by illegally squatting on vacant public and private land and building their own dwellings from whatever materials are at hand (116, 147, 377, 618). In most large cities in developing countries more than one-quarter of the population are squatters. In some, including Kinshasa (Zaire), Colombo (Sri Lanka), and Cartagena (Colombia), the squatters make up 50 to 70 percent of the populace (147). For the most part, however, squatters are not new arrivals to the city, but migrants who have already lived for some time in central city slums or city natives who cannot afford more conventional housing (408, 618). Although the squatter settlements appear to be chaotic, disorganized, and chronically impoverished, the community within them may be functioning well and making great efforts to improve conditions. Once land tenure is secure, the squatters rebuild their shacks into permanent houses and try to obtain basic services (147, 300, 335, 359, 377, 618). Squatters may make substantial investments in housing. In one

Men wash on the sidewalk in Calcutta. Rapidly growing populations make it hard for cities to provide basic services such as running water, sewerage, and electricity. (US AID)
squatter settlement in Manila, for example, the average house was worth almost $1,900 (US) relative to an average annual income of $982 (292).

## Consequences of International Labor Migration

International labor migration, like internal migration, involves flows of labor in one direction and flows of money in the opposite direction. In the country that people leave, the immediate decrease in the size of the labor force often improves the employment situation overall, although it may create some labor shortages and thus induce internal migration or immigration. Likewise, remittances, although inflationary, provide the country of emigration with a source of income, foreign exchange, and potential investment. In the countries receiving migrants the flow of labor contributes to the economy by providing extra or inexpensive labor, although the overall effect on the economy is difficult to measure. When large numbers of “temporary” workers settle permanently, however, as they often do, they may create social, political, and demographic problems.

### Sending Countries

**Labor force and employment.** Many developing countries have welcomed international emigration as a quick cure for high rates of unemployment and underemployment (151, 526). Emigration reduces the competition for jobs at home, and the remittances sent back by the emigrants create new jobs (450). In Jordan and Greece emigration has in fact eliminated almost all unemployment (316, 454). Emigration from the Maghreb to France from 1970 to 1973 cut in half the number of new jobs needed to keep up with population growth and avoid increases in unemployment in North Africa (450).

Emigration may create shortages of skilled workers, however (36, 382, 455, 471, 538). The emigration of professionals, dubbed the “brain drain,” has received much attention (206, 430), but emigration has also caused labor shortages in less skilled fields, such as construction and public utilities, that impede economic development in countries such as Bangladesh, Greece, and Yugoslavia (36, 57, 83, 455).

In some countries the labor shortages created by emigration are reduced by importing other workers. Thus, Indonesians work at agriculture and construction jobs in Malaysia to replace Malaysian workers who have migrated to Singapore and the Middle East (353). Seasonal migrants from Mali work in the millet fields of Mauritania to replace emigrants to France (149). Jordan is the most conspicuous example of this replacement migration. The migration of skilled and semiskilled Jordanian workers to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait has opened up many jobs in the cities and provoked internal, rural-to-urban migration to fill them. Also, Egyptians, Syrians, and Pakistanis enter Jordan in large numbers to fill the jobs of the urban emigrants, the jobs of rural out-migrants, and the new jobs created by remittances flowing into the country (316, 562).

Large-scale, sustained emigration may slow population growth and hence the growth of the labor force (709). For example, emigration has reduced population growth by 25 percent in Upper Volta (692) and by 29 percent in Samoa (380). The emigration must be permanent, however, to produce major long-term effects. What is more, to counteract very high fertility, the flow of emigration would have to be enormous. Nathan Keyfitz has calculated that, to reduce a 3 percent growth rate to zero in a high-fertility setting, 57 percent of all 15-year-olds would have to leave each year (310).

**Remittances.** International migrants send remittances home, just as internal migrants do (see p. M-261), except that the sums are larger because their wages are higher (114, 493). The money is mostly spent on consumption, and it greatly improves the material welfare of the recipients. Because of the large sums involved, international remittances have become the main source of household income in countries such as Lesotho and Montserrat, where emigration has become a way of life (415, 468). The Rif region of northern Morocco is an extreme case: in the early 1970s 38 percent of households were supported entirely by remittances (176). In Bangladesh in 1979 and Pakistan in 1979–80 remittances from emigrants to the Middle East formed, on average, three-quarters of the recipients’ incomes (36, 204).

In 1978 all international remittances amounted to an estimated $24 billion (US) (600). The foreign exchange generated by these remittances may contribute significantly to national economies, helping to overcome a major obstacle to economic expansion and development (574). In Upper

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### Migrants Speak: Experience in Europe

I think the Portuguese are better off in France. I find you can't save any money in France, but you can have a better standard of living; in Portugal we used to go for months without eating meat but in France we eat it two or three times a week . . . .

—41-year-old Portuguese woman in France for two years (237)

We've been here for 14 years now and I've been through just about everything. . . . I was 25 when I came; I was different then and I expected things to be different. . . . I can't imagine the future. . . . We don't like the idea of staying here, but we've got to. . . . Our children are like foreigners when we go back to Greece. They're foreigners there and here, and so are we.

—A 39-year-old Greek woman (237)

If we go home to Portugal it will be more difficult to adapt to life there because the standard of living is better here. The girls don't want us to go back to Portugal. My husband wants to. My husband says he doesn't like living here because he can't speak—he's often fed up—and he has nothing to do on Sundays. With the money we save here, we'd like to build a little house; just one story, to live in when we're old in Portugal.

—53-year-old Portuguese woman in France for several years (237)
Volta, Jordan, and the Yemen Arab Republic, for example, international remittances cover the cost of more than one-third of all imports and are equal to more than 10 percent of the gross national product (see Table 7).

The large sums saved by international migrants allow many of them to set up small businesses when they return home. Opening a shop or cafe is popular, as is buying a taxi or truck, since the return migrants prefer to be self-employed (57, 149, 207, 380, 543, 602). Workers from one small Mexican town migrated to the US for short stays and accumulated the capital to establish small textile factories (142).

Even if remittances are not directly invested in production, they contribute to the economy. Remittances spent on housing can create jobs in construction (207, 311). Expenditures on consumer goods — if they are not imports — can stimulate other domestic industries (149, 151, 455, 574). Even expenditures on basics such as food contribute, aiding small businesses and farming (450).

Remittances may indirectly cause inflation (81, 570). Prices may rise steeply in response to the demand for goods that is generated by remittances (455, 466, 478, 498). The poorest families suffer most from rising costs, because they are least likely to have a migrant relative remitting money. At the same time, the shrinking size of the labor force may push up wages (415, 526).

Return migration. Emigrants carry back new values and work habits from their stay abroad, but they rarely learn specific skills that are useful on their return (13, 14, 90, 207, 452, 570). Migrants who worked in European factories return to North African countries with few factories (382, 455), while Mexicans who picked fruit on US farms go back to cereal agriculture (207). Return migrants thus may serve as agents of change, but they are not necessarily a skilled workforce.

Costs and benefits. The costs and benefits of emigration depend on the characteristics of the migration and on the economy of the labor-exporting country (316, 452, 573). For example, the adverse effects of emigration to oil-producing countries have been less in Jordan than in Egypt because of the differing natures of their domestic labor markets. The flexibility of the Jordanian labor market has allowed those who remain to move up into the jobs vacated by the emigrants. In contrast, the lack of upward mobility in the highly segmented Egyptian labor market has aggravated the labor shortage and wage inflation caused by emigration (76).

Quantitative cost-benefit studies have concluded that in Bangladesh and Pakistan the benefits of remittances and reduced unemployment outweigh the costs of foregone production (36, 204). A similar study of Egypt concluded that migration was definitely beneficial from the perspective of human welfare, although its contribution to economic growth was uncertain (242).

The long-term problem may be economic dependence on international labor migration, which is inherently unstable (14, 316, 382, 452, 522, 601). During the 1973-74 recession major European labor-importers suddenly cut off migration. Emigrants from Morocco and Tunisia found alternative destinations in the Middle East (77, 176), but Turkey was left with a $2.9 billion (US) debt because remittances, expected to finance an ambitious development plan, failed to materialize (382).

Receiving Countries

The effects of migration on receiving countries are difficult to measure. Some countries have welcomed workers from abroad as an inexpensive, supplementary labor pool. In the Middle East, in particular, outside workers have been necessary because the native labor force was too small to implement far-reaching economic development programs funded by oil revenues (76). Even where there is no absolute labor shortage, immigrant workers may accept poorly paid, menial jobs with little security that are unattractive to native workers (469). Exactly how much these foreign workers contribute to the economy is unclear, however, and probably varies with time and place. In theory, their presence may hold down wages and inflation, allow economic expansion, and avoid expensive mechanization and job reallocation (27, 382, 394, 454, 472). Depending on the economy of the receiving country, however, negative im-

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Table 7. Inflows of International Remittances, Selected Countries, 1975-1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region &amp; Recipient Country</th>
<th>Ref. No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (millions US$)</th>
<th>Remittances as Percentage of:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AFRICA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>600, 692</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>203, 600</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>600, 692</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>39.7</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ASIA</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea, Rep. of</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>866</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>3.3</td>
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<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LATIN AMERICA &amp; CARIBBEAN</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MIDDLE EAST &amp; NORTH AFRICA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>897</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>991</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen Arab Rep.</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1,157</td>
<td>160.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen P.D.R.</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


GNP = gross national product
NA = not available
*Merchandise only
pacts may be more important. The immigrants might take jobs away from the most disadvantaged native workers—minorities, teenagers, and women—and depress their wages; or postpone needed economic changes and so aggravate structural economic problems; or drain the economy by sending large amounts of money home (248, 436, 454, 472).

Receiving countries assumed that foreign workers would add flexibility to their economies by coming and going in response to economic cycles and to labor shortages and surpluses in specific industries (382, 394, 472). In practice, foreign workers have not been an easily controlled or flexible labor pool. Illegal migration has thwarted government attempts to control the number of migrants (76). More importantly, the migrants—legal or illegal—do not return home quickly in times of recession, as expected by governments. Instead, in Europe and North America migrants have gradually brought their dependents to join them and have settled permanently (382, 395, 411). Migrants in the Middle East also are beginning to set down roots (76, 670). The permanent settlement of migrant families has spawned demands for health services, education, welfare and unemployment benefits, and conventional housing rather than dormitories (248, 382, 395, 411, 436, 659). Social and political problems are often magnified by natives’ resentment of the outsiders (270, 671).

The demographic impact of migration also is a matter of concern to receiving countries, especially if immigrants settle permanently. Immigration can increase population growth, as it has done in the Ivory Coast and Gambia (693), or offset natural decrease among the native population, as it has done in West Germany (162, 303). In addition, the fertility of immigrants may influence the rate of natural increase. Because immigrants are concentrated in childbearing ages and may have higher fertility than the natives, immigrants often produce a disproportionate share of the next generation (414). Thus immigrants formed 8.5 percent of the Belgian population in 1975 but contributed 16.8 percent of the births in that year (676).

Migrants—internal as well as international—may pose special health problems to the areas receiving them. They may spread infectious diseases from the area of origin to the area of destination. In addition, the act of migrating itself stresses the migrants mentally and physically, since they must adapt to a new environment, life style, and possibly socioeconomic status (668). They may face new occupational hazards or life in a crowded squatter settlement with poor sanitation (43, 514). At the same time, migration changes their access to health services. While services often are more abundant in urban areas and developed countries, cultural and language barriers may cut migrants off from them (668).

POLICIES ON INTERNAL MIGRATION

The majority of developing-country governments are concerned about the economic and political repercussions of internal migration. They have implemented a wide variety of explicit policies—

- to slow rural-to-urban migration, by encouraging rural development and creating urban barriers to migration, or
- to divert internal migrants away from the largest cities to other destinations, including small cities and frontier areas (638).

In addition, some governments have tried to accommodate existing migrants by providing better housing and more jobs in the city.

Explicit population distribution policies have been costly and have had little success because of the contradictory impact of other national development plans, lack of political support, and limited understanding of specific migration trends and causes. To succeed, a population distribution policy must have realistic goals, be integrated into the national economic development plan, and address the causes of migration in both rural and urban sectors. Policies to manage and channel rural-to-urban migration in order to maximize its benefits may be more efficient than trying to stop it.

Government Concern

Many governments have expressed concern about the distribution of their populations, and especially about urbanization. For example, the Parliamentary Conference on Population and Development in Africa, held in 1981, concluded:

Governments are particularly concerned about the uneven spatial distribution of population in relation to resources, particularly land and water, which is unfavourable to integrating the population into economic, social and political activities. They feel that this trend is in conflict with development aims. The situation has worsened during the last 10 or 20 years due to population growth, although the cause is not entirely due to demographic processes. (458)
Governments have hoped that rural development activities would not only stimulate more food production, but also discourage large-scale migration to the city. The assumption is that higher rural incomes can reduce the economic incentive to migrate, while more services and amenities can raise the rural standard of living closer to that of urban levels (20, 97, 236, 470, 499, 500).

Rural Development

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>No. of Countries</th>
<th>Fertility</th>
<th>Spatial Distribution</th>
<th>Immigration</th>
<th>Emigration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEVELOPING REGIONS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia &amp; Pacific</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America &amp; Caribbean</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEVELOPED REGIONS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: For fertility, categories were: too low—higher rates desirable; satisfactory; and too high—lower rates desirable. For spatial distribution, categories were: appropriate (given above); partially appropriate; and inappropriate. For immigration and emigration, categories were: immigration/emigration significant and either too high; satisfactory, or too low; immigration/emigration not significant and more desired; or situation satisfactory.


According to the Governor of Jakarta in 1970, "urbanization has come to such a hopelessly bad situation that it can endanger the safety of living and order in the capital" (276).

In every area of the world, more nations consider population distribution a problem than fertility. Among the developing countries, 22 percent are satisfied with fertility, in contrast to only 5 percent that rate their population distribution as fully appropriate (see Table 8). Also, more than twice as many developing countries have policies to slow or reverse internal migration as have policies to lower fertility (see Table 9).

Much of the concern with population distribution stems from fears that too rapid rural-to-urban migration could retard economic development (see p. M-262). Frequently, however, governments simply want to reduce the burden on public services and all-too-visible poverty and unemployment in the capital city, which they associate with immigrants. The in-migrants also may be perceived as a political threat — the nucleus of a discontented urban proletariat. Concerns for regional and individual equity also may be important. Other motives include a rural ideologial orientation, as in China; national defense, as in South Korea; and ethnic political balance, as in Malaysia (100, 367, 506, 555).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of Countries</th>
<th>Lower Fertility</th>
<th>Slow or Reverse Internal Migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEVELOPING REGIONS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia &amp; Pacific</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America &amp; Caribbean</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEVELOPED REGIONS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Rural development projects include a wide range of activities, from capital-intensive measures, such as providing irrigation, farm machinery, and high-yield crop varieties, to land reform, introduction of labor-intensive agricultural techniques, and the provision of infrastructure and social services (182, 440). Thus evaluating the overall effects of rural development programs on migration is difficult. On the whole, however, rural development programs have a poor record in slowing rural-to-urban migration (182, 499, 500). In part, this may be because of failure to implement programs fully (460, 470, 558). An even more basic problem is that many rural development activities may promote rather than discourage migration (182, 499, 500). A recent analysis of 15 types of rural development activities concluded that 11 could have mixed impacts or might actually accelerate rural-to-urban migration in the short or long term (499, 500). Family planning was one of the few that would unambiguously discourage migration in the long run (499, 500) (see Table 10). Rural development may be more successful in promoting alternative mobility patterns, such as commuting or migrating to smaller cities, than in stopping out-migration altogether (193, 499, 500, 550).

One danger of rural development is that capital-intensive agricultural innovations are accessible only to large-scale farmers who have money or credit. As the rising production of the big farms lowers crop prices, the small farmer comes under pressure to sell out (182, 499) or to send children to the city so that they can send back remittances to finance new agricultural technology (583). Also, paid laborers may be displaced by the tractors and other machinery (182, 337, 440, 499, 558, 599). More labor-intensive innovations, such as simple farm implements or fertilizers, may generate more jobs and more income for smaller farmers, but the evidence on this point is scanty (182).

Land reform might hold back rural out-migration (499, 500), but without technical and financial assistance for small farmers new economic disparities have formed between smaller and larger farmers (182). Another problem, seen in many Latin American programs, is that little land is
### Table 10. Possible Impact on Migration of Development Activities in Rural Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development Activity</th>
<th>Possible Effect on Rural Population</th>
<th>Impact on Migration</th>
<th>Development Activity</th>
<th>Possible Effect on Rural Population</th>
<th>Impact on Migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family planning programs</td>
<td>Decreased fertility and population pressure</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Agricultural services; credit and technical assistance</td>
<td>Increased income for large farmers, commercialization and modernity of agriculture; increased exclusion of small farmers; increased rural inequity and poverty</td>
<td>Moderate slowing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land reform</td>
<td>Increased rural production, income, social change, and demand for urban goods and services; decreased demand for hired labor</td>
<td>Moderate slowing</td>
<td>Off-farm employment in rural enterprises</td>
<td>Increased employment and income; increased economic activity in market centers; acquisition of management skills</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land rent ceilings, tenancy controls</td>
<td>Mechanization, eviction of tenants</td>
<td>Weak acceleration</td>
<td>Rural public works</td>
<td>Increased employment, familiarity with modern sector, and demand for urban goods and services</td>
<td>Strong acceleration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land colonization and rural resettlement</td>
<td>New opportunities for farmers</td>
<td>Weak slowing</td>
<td>Rural roads</td>
<td>Increased rural-urban integration and commercialization of agriculture</td>
<td>Very weak slowing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Green Revolution” hybrid vigour seeds and fertilizer</td>
<td>Increased income, modernity, demand for urban goods and services and modern farm inputs; increased land value and tenant eviction; increased rural-urban integration and utilization of labor; disruption of traditional power structure and local political economy</td>
<td>Moderately weak acceleration</td>
<td>Rural electrification</td>
<td>Increased agricultural activity, income, and rural-urban integration</td>
<td>Very weak slowing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm mechanization</td>
<td>Either decreased or increased demand for labor and increased rural-urban integration</td>
<td>Moderate acceleration</td>
<td>Rural social services and education</td>
<td>Increased modern, urban skills and attitudes</td>
<td>Very strong acceleration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanical irrigation</td>
<td>Increased production, rural income, and demand for urban goods and services</td>
<td>Slowing</td>
<td>Potable water supply</td>
<td>Improved health, productivity, and income</td>
<td>Weak slowing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rural health services and improved diet</td>
<td>Decreased general mortality and increased population pressure; increased productivity and income; decreased fertility and infant mortality</td>
<td>Weak slowing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Rhoda, R. Rural development and urban migration: can we keep them down on the farm? International Migration Review 17(1): 34-64. Spring 1983.

Actually distributed (460, 462, 463). Also, continued population growth has weakened the initial impact of land reform in some areas. Either landholdings must be further fragmented for the next generation or most children must be excluded from the land. In either case out-migration will increase (100, 182, 268, 336).

Other approaches to discourage rural out-migration, including the creation of rural industrial jobs, public works programs, and school construction, also have mixed effects. Rural industries are not labor-intensive and are located in small towns rather than truly rural areas (182, 593). Public works programs temporarily employ unskilled labor but teach workers skills and aspirations that might encourage them to migrate to larger centers eventually (499, 500). Building roads reduces the cost of marketing agricultural produce and so increases farm income, but it also makes out-migration easier (110, 128, 182, 378, 569, 593, 619). Building rural schools stops young people from migrating in search of education, but it provides them with both the desire and the credentials to find an urban job (96, 369, 406, 499, 500, 617).

**Urban Barriers to Migration**

Administrators of rapidly growing cities have tried to discourage the influx of migrants by reducing housing and...
Overall, efforts to limit city residence and/or employment depend on a strong administrative structure, coercive measures, and the availability of government-controlled jobs or benefits that an individual might lose by attempting to migrate. At best, such efforts are likely to cause ill-feeling, petty corruption, and a rise in various forms of illegal and evasive behavior (193, 274, 336). Unless other political considerations are involved, the costs are likely to outweigh the presumed benefits.

**Encouraging the Growth of Small Cities**

Where continued urbanization is accepted as inevitable but the capital city is thought to be growing too large, governments may use various incentives to channel migrants towards smaller cities. Most often the government names some existing cities to be regional centers. Concepción (Chile), Valencia (Venezuela), and Khon Kaen (Thailand) are three examples (190, 419, 592). Sometimes governments build entirely new cities partly to stimulate migration to a different area. Among famous examples are the newly constructed capitals Brasilia (Brazil) and Islamabad (Pakistan) (495). There are also plans to shift the capitals in Nigeria and Tanzania (596, 705). Venezuela used oil earnings during the 1960s and 1970s to build Ciudad Guayana, a new industrial city (100, 218, 517). Current plans in Egypt envision a series of small new cities to absorb over 15 million people by the year 2000 (298). Three are already under construction (3).

Most policies attempt to relocate jobs to attract migrants. The government may move its own agencies to smaller cities. It also may encourage businesses to do so by building industrial parks; providing needed infrastructure and services such as roads, electricity, and communication; offering tax exemptions; subsidizing interest rates on loans; and prohibiting industrial expansion in the major cities (190, 336, 453, 502, 590, 592). Finally, the government may encourage individuals to move to the regional centers by providing information about opportunities there in contrast to the costs of life in the capital (295).

While the relocation of public-sector jobs has influenced population distribution, few businesses have responded to incentives to move. The largest city often has the only source of skilled labor, the largest market, and access to the government (190, 502, 595). During the two years following the implementation of Tanzania’s decentralization policy in 1970, only 10 of 30 major new industries located Jobs. The demolition of squatter settlements has been the most common tactic throughout Latin America, Africa, and Asia (1, 147, 553, 568, 596). Demolition rarely succeeds for long, however, because most of the evicted return and resume squatting—often in the same location (147). Nor does it seem to discourage further in-migration. Periodic demolition of most squatter settlements in Nairobi, for example, may have influenced urban settlement patterns, but it did not stop in-migration (568).

Limiting migrant employment may be more effective. During the crackdown on migration into Jakarta in the early 1970s, sidewalk vending and becaks (bicycle rickshaws) were barred from downtown. The restrictions eliminated two major sources of employment for migrants and induced some migrants to leave (456). More recently, in 1981, there were clashes between the national police and ambulantes (street vendors) in Lima, Peru, when the ambulantes were forcibly removed from the center city streets to rental stalls in open air markets (376). This policy had been so difficult to enforce that the city had to create a special police force to control the ambulantes.

Other attempts to restrict internal migration have involved urban residence permits. The Governor of Jakarta, for example, established a formal pass system in 1970. New migrants received a temporary residence card when they deposited with the police a sum of money equal to two times their return fare. Six months later they could obtain a permanent residence card by proving that they had a job and a place to live, or else they were given a one-way ticket home (440, 456). There was a sharp drop in the number of new arrivals in Jakarta for a year after the system was set up; this was more likely due to the exceptionally good harvest than to the closed-city policy (251). In Africa, governments in the Congo, Niger, Tanzania, and Zaire all have tried at one time or another to expel the unemployed from their cities, but all attempts have failed for lack of enforcement (247, 506).

Only where there are severe restrictions on individual movement can permit systems succeed. Although not motivated primarily by economic concerns, the strictly enforced internal passport system in South Africa, for example, has prevented the mass migration of blacks into the cities (167). In Cuba the overall system of ration, residence, and worker identification cards, although not directly monitored for migration purposes, has probably made it harder to move to Havana (344, 647). In many countries such systems would not be legal or acceptable.

A few countries, such as Vietnam and China, have attempted even more rigorous measures to reverse migration and reduce the size of the major cities (66, 107, 112, 126, 188, 485). In China some 10 to 15 million youths born and raised in the city were moved to rural areas, or “rusticated,” from the 1950s to the 1970s, and an even greater number of country-bred students in city schools were returned to rural areas (66). Even at great cost in human suffering, these measures have not been fully successful.

Overall, efforts to limit city residence and/or employment depend on a strong administrative structure, coercive measures, and the availability of government-controlled jobs or benefits that an individual might lose by attempting to migrate. At best, such efforts are likely to cause ill-feeling, petty corruption, and a rise in various forms of illegal and evasive behavior (193, 274, 336). Unless other political considerations are involved, the costs are likely to outweigh the presumed benefits.

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**Women work in a new textile factory in northeastern Brazil. Governments may divert migrants to alternative destinations by influencing where businesses locate — through tax incentives, loans, and zoning regulations. (World Bank/Pickerell)**
areas to colonization or raise rural incomes by lowering the cost of going to market, they also make migration to cities easier. 

There are several reasons for colonization programs: to further out-migration (462). The potential of colonization increased since Khon Kaen was designated a development center in 1962 (592). 

Colonizing the Frontiers

Governments can encourage migration to rural destinations if there is sparsely populated, arable land available. There are several reasons for colonization programs: to distribute the population more evenly, to expand agricultural production, to provide land for the landless, or to enhance national security along border areas (51). In the short term, these population movements ease population pressure in the areas of origin, which may discourage further out-migration (462). The potential of colonization programs is limited, however, by the availability of land (336, 594).

Government supports for colonization range from creating complete new communities to merely building roads. In many countries, including Brazil, Indonesia, and Malaysia, the government has recruited and transported the migrants, cleared the land, built roads and utilities, constructed houses, supported the settlers for a year or two, and offered technical assistance and credit (49, 265, 384). The cost of government-sponsored communities has been high, ranging from $2,000 (US) per family settled in Nigeria to $11,000 in Malaysia (193, 224). The more successful programs have spent $5,000 or more per family, but money alone does not guarantee success (224). Colonization also takes place spontaneously as families travel to frontier areas without government support, often making use of newly constructed roads, as has occurred in Brazil, Bolivia, and the Ivory Coast (51, 218, 321). Obviously, the cost per settler is far less where colonization occurs spontaneously (51), and the more motivated, spontaneous settlers may be more likely to stay (589).

Colonization programs have had a mixed record of success (51, 193, 588). In India over one-third of the colonists deserted the Dandakaranya project (440), while up to 90 percent left some settlements in eastern Bolivia (589). Even in relatively successful programs with low desertion rates, the absolute number of people involved may be small (50, 100, 555). One of the largest and best administered programs, the FELDA program in Malaysia, by 1980 had shifted 379,000 people, or less than 3 percent of the national population (432), and those people were probably not potential rural-to-urban migrants (223). In part because of road-building and colonization programs, the Brazilian frontier had a 50 percent growth rate from 1960 to 1970, but even so the growth rate in urban areas was 61 percent (685). Without colonization, of course, urban growth might have been even higher.

Administrative effectiveness and political commitment have proved to be the most important determinants of the success or failure of colonization programs (224). Problems have included divided or shifting responsibility among different government agencies, poor choice of sites and settlers, and inability to supply promised technical assistance, tools, credit, and infrastructure (49, 51, 384, 481, 555, 578, 588).

Coping with Migration

Instead of trying to slow or stop rural-to-urban migration, governments may accommodate the migrants by improving housing and creating more jobs in the cities. This approach eases the problems produced by rapid urban growth but, because these measures are indirect subsidies to migrants, almost certainly encourages continued immigration (193, 506, 612). In fact, all urban development efforts, regardless of their motives, both help cities to cope with increased populations and attract more migrants.

Housing. Most accommodation policies have focused on housing, perhaps because it is the most visible of urban problems. The traditional approach has been to relocate squatters and slum dwellers to low-rent public housing projects. Unfortunately, these are often so expensive to build that rents are set far too high for migrants (147, 334, 596, 684).
Neighbors pour cement for a house foundation in Lima. In order to cope with the housing shortage, some governments are providing lots with basic services to in-migrants who build their own houses. (Susan Lobo, A House of My Own (359))

Beginning in the 1960s, innovative governments recognized that the needs of so many migrants could be met only with cheap, self-help housing of the kind that already existed in the squatter settlements (147). In Lima the emphasis was put on selling to the squatters, at a nominal cost, titles to the land that they occupied (140). Studies in Manila and Ankara, as well as in Lima, show that squatters have made dramatic improvements in their housing once they gained a legal right to it (300, 334). Other programs provide roads, sewer connections, piped water, electricity, schools, and health clinics to existing squatter settlements (61, 147, 159, 334, 359, 684). Even minimal services are costly, however. For example, the electrification of the squatter settlements in Caracas, Venezuela, cost Bs 4.5 million (US $1 million) from 1965 to 1973 (419).

"Sites and services" projects are another urban self-help scheme for migrants and other poor city dwellers. The government divides vacant land into housing lots, supplies roads and utilities, and sells or leases the lots to people who build their own houses (140, 147, 281, 567). These projects use tenant labor and local materials to build housing, thus saving money; they suit the squatters' preference for location and land tenure over amenities; and they preserve existing squatter investments in housing (334, 684). They still are not cheap, however, given the numbers to be served. A development for 40,000 families in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, is projected to cost $13 million (US) for land and $1.9 million for infrastructure. House foundations for 18,000 families are projected to cost an additional $3.2 million (170). In addition to costs, locations far from jobs, unfilled promises of services, insufficient numbers of lots, and unrealistically high construction standards have been problems in projects around the world, including Dakar, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, and Lima (334, 359, 417, 568, 607).

Employment. One early attempt to provide more jobs for a growing urban population was made in Kenya. In the 1964 Tripartite Agreement the trade unions agreed to forego wage increases, while the government and major private employers promised to increase total employment by 15 and 10 percent, respectively. The labor force did expand, but the new jobs stimulated further in-migration, so there was no decrease in unemployment (506). More recently, the government of Manila has tried to increase its payroll by using labor-intensive methods to provide services such as street cleaning (334), while the government of Malaysia encourages street vending by providing loans, kiosks, markets, and training in business methods (440).

Political Problems and Policy Failure

One reason for the failure of internal migration policies is the lack of genuine political support (440, 495). Government support may be undermined by pressure from industry to allow continued growth of the urban labor supply and so keep wages down (357). Also, political leaders may want to invest in the capital city as a symbol of national independence and strength (503, 581, 590). Even when the political commitment exists, every change in government jeopardizes it (617). Lack of continuity is especially critical for population distribution policies, since most can make an impact only over many years, even decades (190, 495).

A second problem is policy making based on insufficient knowledge of specific migration trends, causes, and consequences (50, 440). Programs are not always tailored to the needs of a particular country. In addition, officials have unrealistically high expectations about how much a population distribution policy can accomplish and how quickly (504).

The third and probably most important problem is conflict between expressed population distribution goals and the effects on population distribution of other national development plans (181, 224, 495, 502, 590). For example, the geographic allocation of the national budget, national trade policies, minimum wage laws, and the location of government agencies all influence population distribution. Because more resources go into these measures than into population redistribution schemes, their impact outweighs most efforts to influence migration (193, 400, 502). Because of internal political pressures in developing countries, actual government investments usually favor urban areas, regardless of the avowed priority given to developing the rural sector (336, 404, 640). For example, Bujumbura, the capital city of Burundi, received 95 percent of the transportation and communication money and 85 percent of the housing, health, and education money in the 1980 national budget (236), even though its population is less than 4 percent of the national total (2). China and Cuba are exceptions to this pattern: resources of all kinds have been shifted to the rural sector and, partly as a result, urban growth has slowed (169, 554).

National trade policies tend indirectly to subsidize urban industries at the expense of agriculture (89, 495, 590). Thus, in West Africa, for example, government marketing boards and import/export duties keep at a minimum the prices that farmers obtain for their crops. At the same time, the government limits the price of staple foods in urban centers and so keeps the cost of urban living artificially low. Also, rural residents pay fees and taxes for services that primarily benefit city residents (239, 506).

Minimum wage laws routinely cover or are enforced for urban jobs only, in effect legislating a differential between rural and urban incomes (89, 163, 462, 590). This differential is thought to be one of the primary causes of migration (see p. M-253). When urban wages cannot fall as labor supply increases, the equilibrium effect of migration is impeded (252).
Centralization of government in the largest city also affects migration, since the government is a major employer (506). Also, businesses locate near government to deal with administrative agencies and to lobby (495, 640). Paradoxically, the more vigorous a role the government takes in economic and regional planning, the more likely it may be to stimulate migration to the capital.

These criticisms of population redistribution policies are supported by decades of experience in Western Europe. France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden in fact have succeeded in reversing the migration streams into their capitals, but at great cost and only by making population distribution goals primary in their national development plans. These countries failed in initial attempts to influence migration simply by improving infrastructure and making low-interest loans to industries in designated development areas. Success was achieved only when the governments introduced a broad range of stronger measures: direct grants of 20 percent of the cost of new industrial projects in designated areas, the prohibition of new industry in congested cities, and the systematic relocation of government agencies and government-controlled industries (598). Reversals of urbanization are now taking place in a number of developed countries (660, 708). Since some of these countries lack redistribution policies, it is not clear how large a role policy plays.

In summary, governments lack control over many of the major influences on migration volume and patterns. They often have limited influence over the decisions of large private businesses, which can have an important impact on migration (503). Other major factors, such as distance, age structure, the size and growth rate of the labor force, and links between urban migrants and rural residents, can change only slowly at best. Thus effective short-term government policies would often have to be highly coercive and/or would require massive investments of scarce public funds and administrative resources that might be better spent on other development efforts.

**POLICIES ON INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION**

UN inquiries have revealed relatively little official dissatisfaction with international migration trends (635). As a basic element of national sovereignty, however, nations routinely regulate movement into and out of their territories by means of passports, visas, border checkpoints, and, in extreme cases, walls and other physical barriers. Border controls are supplemented by laws discriminating between the resident immigrant and the citizen (139, 371).

Currently there is much debate in labor-importing countries about curbing or strictly controlling further immigration and preventing the permanent settlement of immigrant laborers (326, 635). Restrictions have failed, however, to stop illegal migration or to prevent immigrants from settling. Thus policies to cope with resident immigrant populations are increasingly important (636). Labor-exporting countries, in contrast, are more concerned with maintaining emigration levels and maximizing economic returns. Their policies aim to protect emigrant citizens and to manage the flow of remittances (304, 628).

**Immigration Policies**

The governments of developed countries that have traditionally welcomed permanent immigrants, including Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States, have recently reassessed their immigration policies. Discrimination based on national origins has been eliminated, but the number of immigrants admitted is still restricted. The current admissions policies of these countries are based on job skills and family ties (326, 636).

Some other countries, including Israel, South Africa, and most Latin American nations, actively encourage permanent immigration but on a selective basis. Most want skilled workers, while Israel accepts all Jewish migrants. None of these countries is now attracting as many immigrants as desired (620).

A third group of countries encourages or at least tolerates temporary immigrant workers to relieve labor shortages. Multilateral agreements have opened borders to workers within certain regions, including the Andean area, West Africa, Scandinavia, and the European Economic Community (139, 374, 628). Formal programs to recruit migrant labor from other countries now operate in South Africa and the Middle East (76, 158) and have been used in Europe and the United States (185, 326). In general, these countries try to limit the number of workers and their dependents admitted and to prevent them from settling permanently (326, 670).

Border controls are a common tactic to limit migration. Where land borders are long, however, it is almost impossible to stop migrants. Mexicans routinely slip into the United States by swimming the Rio Grande, while Colombians follow the caminos verdes (green trails) across the 1,500-mile frontier with Venezuela (185, 195). Would-be...
Migrants pose a special challenge to family planning programs. Migrants are concentrated in the childbearing ages and generally come from rural areas or developing countries where contraception is less well-known and less used than in their urban or developed-country destinations (172, 256, 352, 410, 633, 664). Their need for special services varies, however, depending on how different they are, culturally and linguistically, from the usual family planning clients.

**Rural-to-Urban Migrants**

From what little is known, rural-to-urban migrants' levels of contraceptive knowledge and practice fall somewhere between rural and urban levels. In São Paulo, Brazil, for example, in 1965, 78 percent of migrants had ever used contraception, compared with 85 percent of urban nonmigrants and 62 percent of rural nonmigrants (496). Studies in Bangkok and Manila, which could distinguish between recent and long-term migrants, found that levels of contraceptive knowledge and use rose with the duration of residence in the city. The migrants arrived in the city with the same levels of contraceptive knowledge and use as prevailed in the countryside. Gradually they took advantage of the easier access to family planning services and supplies. By five to seven years, their levels of contraceptive knowledge and use were equal to or greater than those of urban nonmigrants (215, 263).

Surveys in Thailand in 1970 and 1973 found that recent rural-to-urban migrants shared in the nationwide rise in levels of knowledge, approval, and practice of birth control, "suggesting that recency of in-migration in itself is not necessarily a major barrier to the assimilation of the fertility values and practices of women at the place of destination" (215). A study of obstacles to family planning among migrants in Rabat, Morocco, found that they were not related to migrant status, but consisted instead of factors that also deter many nonmigrants from using services — high costs, long waits, rude treatment by health professionals, and dependence on rumors for information (401).

Therefore, a strategy to extend and improve family planning programs for all the urban poor, rather than one that singles out migrants, may be the most efficient way to reach rural-to-urban migrants (10, 154, 667). Family planning programs trying to reach migrants in urban areas should concentrate on the location and the quality of their services. Services should be readily available in the squatter settlements and slums where migrants live, especially since recent migrants may have particular trouble locating urban services. Distributing contraceptives door-to-door or through migrants' social groups are good ways to reach migrants (183, 476).

Although the need and opportunity are great in urban areas, migrants to rural areas also need family planning services. In Malaysia, for example, the major colonization program, FELDA, has expanded the existing national family planning program to cover its new rural settlements. FELDA encourages family planning so that rapid population growth among settlers will not overwhelm the resources tapped by colonization (9, 255).

**International Migrants**

In some countries immigrants accompanied by their spouses form a large pool of potential clients for family planning programs. In West Germany, for example, 16 percent of all clients of Pro Familia in 1979 had come from another country (287). The Portuguese Commission on the Status of Women is trying to bring family planning information to Portuguese emigrants in other countries by distributing educational materials and making radio broadcasts (56). To date, special family planning programs for immigrants have been launched in Australia and several countries of Western Europe (256, 287). There are also special programs for Indochinese refugees in Thailand, Hong Kong, Australia, and the US (123, 329, 392, 480). Special programs such as these can be politically sensitive, partly because international migration is itself a political issue and partly because of suspicions that the motive for the programs is eugenic rather than humanitarian (171, 287).

What have family planning programs for international migrants discovered? First, language barriers pose an immediate problem. Indochinese migrants in Australia, for example, did not use the Family Planning Association because they could not make appointments, let alone discuss their needs with a counselor or doctor (256). Therefore many programs for migrants have translated written materials and hired interpreters or bilingual staff members (287, 329, 480). Second, family planning personnel have to understand how cultural differences affect their work. For example, they may not appreciate the importance that their clients place on the male in family planning decision-making; they may not be able to judge when clients fully understand instructions (256, 287, 329, 480). Third, family planning programs may have to make special efforts to reach migrants, by making home visits or by using migrant organizations and individuals to spread information about services (171, 256, 287). Illegal migrants may actively avoid contact with a family planning organization for fear of being deported.

Family planning programs that serve temporary immigrants may indirectly reach sending countries as well, since return migrants often take home positive attitudes and information about family planning. For example, Italians who have worked abroad may be partially responsible for increasingly favorable attitudes towards birth control in Italy (287). Yemeni men who have worked in Saudi Arabia are introducing oral contraceptives to the most conservative part of the country (420).

Overall, the same sympathetic, user-oriented approaches that reach migrants also enhance the quality of family planning for nonmigrants, including young people, men, ethnic communities, and people with little education. In fact, improved family planning services for all — not just for migrants — should be an integral part of population distribution policy.
The oil-producing Persian Gulf states have extensive policies to try to ensure that migrants working there ultimately return home. Work and residence permits are used to keep track of migrants and to restrict the opportunities of illegal migrants (371). In Europe these permits are valid for a limited time only and may tie the holder to a specific job or occupation (270, 395, 411). African countries, such as Botswana, Niger, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Zambia, issue work permits only when there are no local workers who possess the skills needed. In some of these countries, the immigrant is also required to train a local worker as an eventual replacement (285, 628). Enforcement problems limit the effectiveness of permit systems. Forged documents are usually available, and workers also may manage without valid permits. Punitive measures aimed at employers, such as those used in France, are probably more effective than penalties against the migrants themselves, such as those used in the United States (185, 325, 435).

Countries that encourage temporary labor migration may try to control the flow by assigning responsibility to a single government agency. This agency recruits the overseas workers, oversees their travel, and arranges for their jobs (70, 371, 411). According to a 1960 international agreement, for example, all Ivory Coast employers seeking workers from Upper Volta must apply through the national labor departments of the two countries. The government of the Ivory Coast pays Upper Volta a fee of CFAF 1.500 (about US$56) per worker. Most Upper Voltan workers evade this system, however, and directly contact employers in the Ivory Coast (137).

The oil-producing Persian Gulf states have extensive policies to try to ensure that migrants working there ultimately return home. Work and residence permits are strictly enforced; workers are forbidden to bring dependents to join them; and the labor-importing countries increasingly prefer Asian workers, who can be segregated and excluded from society more easily than other Arabs (565, 628). Thus immigrants in the Middle East are without political rights, social benefits, the freedom to change jobs, or any possibility of becoming citizens (670). The Arab oil exporters also are turning to integrated project packages, in which a foreign company supplies labor as well as management, engineering, equipment, and supplies. Migrant workers thus remain employees of a firm from their own nation and are employed for a single project only (304, 562, 565, 628).

Dealing with Illegal Migrants

In most areas immigration controls do little to stop illegal migration. Although impossible to count precisely, illegal immigrants may number up to 700,000 in the Ivory Coast, one million in Western Europe, one to two million in Venezuela, and three to six million in the United States (305, 513, 607, 628, 652, 690). Perhaps one million were recently expelled from Nigeria (2, 121, 166).

Governments may tolerate illegal immigrants as long as their labor is needed, the economy is prosperous, and political relations with labor-exporting countries are amicable. Argentina, for example, accepts illegal migration as a way to increase the supply of manual labor and the country's population size (294). Economic recession and political tension may disturb this tolerance, however. France, for example, has consistently adjusted the levels of migration permitted from Algeria to reflect the state of diplomatic relations between the two countries (403). In the US and Europe the number of deportations rises and falls with economic prosperity (185, 325).

The mass expulsion of migrants from Nigeria is only the most recent of many such expulsions around the world, carried out in response to political and economic pressures (19, 294). Libya expelled first Tunisian workers in 1976 and then Egyptians in 1977 for foreign policy reasons (177). In Africa expulsions of previously tolerated, undocumented migrants, for both economic and political reasons, have been occurring for more than two decades (19, 239, 628). In the Western hemisphere Honduras and Venezuela have resorted to expulsions (12, 148). Massive expulsions cause economic problems both for the labor-importing country, which suffers sudden labor shortages, and the labor-exporting country, which is forced to absorb many workers on short notice (16, 20, 121, 122).

European countries have used less drastic measures to encourage unwanted migrants to return home. France has been most active: during 1975-80 almost 1,700 migrants received industrial and agricultural training before going home, and over 93,000 received either F 5,000 or F 10,000 each between 1977 and 1981. These programs affected only a few of the four million foreigners in France, however, and in addition may chiefly have helped migrants who were already planning to return (325, 340, 520). France, West Germany, and the Netherlands also have offered financial and technical assistance to return migrants trying to start businesses in their home countries (340, 350, 520, 677).

The alternative to forcing or encouraging departures is to accommodate the migrants (508). France, for example, has a long tradition of allowing migrants to regularize their status after entering the country illegally, while Argentina, Venezuela, Canada, and the Netherlands have granted amnesties to illegal migrants for brief periods (70, 201, 435, 628). Following the Action Program adopted by the European Economic Community in 1976, West Germany,
France, Belgium, and the Netherlands are working to eliminate discrimination against migrants; to provide them with education, vocational training, and social security benefits; and to reunite migrant families (29, 70, 284, 395, 411, 507). While making migrant populations stable, these policies do not grant migrants citizenship and full political rights (613, 626). In the US, while illegal migrants are sometimes sought out and deported, any children of migrants born in the US are automatically US citizens.

Emigration Policies

Many communist countries and a few developing countries, including Algeria, Iraq, and Syria, have tried to limit the emigration of skilled workers by refusing to issue them passports and other documents. Such policies can be difficult to enforce. Furthermore, they may backfire by encouraging skilled illegal emigrants to stay away permanently rather than temporarily (139, 203, 403). Other techniques also have been used to discourage emigration. Haiti charges high fees for passports, exit visas, and return visas (37). Jordan offers incentives to keep skilled workers at home, including tax exemptions and fringe benefits in health, education, and housing (124, 203). Some countries, including Iraq and Taiwan, have also tried to repatriate emigrant professionals by offering financial incentives or jobs (11, 628, 710).

Most emigration policies are designed to encourage but control the flow of labor through:
- formal recruitment procedures,
- bilateral agreements with labor-importers, and
- organizations to support and protect citizens abroad.

Government employment services in countries such as Colombia, Turkey, Morocco, Egypt, Upper Volta, and Mauritius provide information about job vacancies abroad, recruit workers, and prepare them for the trip. In the Philippines and Thailand the government works toward the same ends through private employment agencies. These employment services have not been able to prevent individual contacts between employers and workers, however (137, 284, 350, 628, 646). South Korea has developed a new approach, now used by many Asian countries, that involves restricting foreign firms from recruiting workers and at the same time promoting integrated project packages to export management, engineering, equipment, and labor (304, 628).

In Europe some labor-exporting countries have tried to assure the welfare of their emigrants through bilateral agreements (137, 327, 348, 515). Italy, for example, in negotiations with Switzerland, tried to ensure equal salaries, accident insurance, social welfare benefits, and medical care for migrants, as well as the rights to job mobility, resident status, and immigration of dependents. Because Italy's bargaining position was weak, the results were limited (102). By contrast with Europe, bilateral agreements are rare in the Middle East (139). Also in Europe, special organizations to protect migrant workers and to strengthen the migrants' ties to the home country have been established (403, 515). Various international organizations, including the United Nations General Assembly and the International Labour Organisation, are also continuing their efforts to ensure the human rights of international migrants (284, 707).

Some labor-exporting countries have argued that they should be compensated for their loss of manpower. Compensations proposals include a global tax system, an international fund financed by labor-importers and disbursed to labor-exporters, and bilateral agreements on payments from importers to exporters (71, 82, 304). Administrative problems, equity issues, and, above all, political problems prevent implementation of any compensation scheme.

Managing Remittances

The governments of labor-exporting countries have tried both to increase the amount of remittances and to channel the money into productive investments (104, 304). Remittances equal to a fixed percentage of wages are compulsory for miners from Lesotho, Swaziland, and Botswana, construction workers and seamen from the Philippines, and South Korean company workers (158, 304, 628). Most countries, however, rely on incentives to bring money home and keep it out of black-market exchanges. Many offer emigrants special, high rates of exchange or allow them to maintain foreign-currency accounts in home banks at attractive interest rates (104, 176, 203, 327, 372, 515). Others, including Colombia, Spain, Turkey, Bangladesh, India, Sudan, and Tunisia, also permit emigrant workers to import some kinds of goods duty free (104, 175, 372, 476, 520, 600).

There have been reports from Morocco, Bangladesh, and India that these incentives are effective in capturing remittances (104, 372, 628). The only quantitative analysis of remittance policies, dealing with Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey, reached different conclusions, however. It found that (1) high-interest foreign exchange accounts did not increase remittances but only replaced domestic currency accounts, (2) special exchange rates did not encourage remittances through official channels, and (3) official chan-
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has addressed the causes and effects of population growth. While population distribution and population growth are both of intense interest to policymakers in many countries, there is an "artificial but well-entrenched" division between population distribution policies and population growth policies. Little attention has been given either to the relationships between population growth and distribution or to the impact that policy directed at one has on the other. Yet in many cases population distribution efforts may be more successful if they also address the causes and effects of population growth.

**Theoretical Bases for Policies**

In the development of policies on population growth, the theory of the demographic transition has proved useful. Demographic transition theory suggests that populations move from a predevelopment equilibrium of high birth and high death rates with little population growth; through a phase of development in which death rates fall faster than birthrates, causing rapid population growth; then through a fall in birthrates and a slower decline in death rates, eventually reaching another equilibrium with little population growth. Only this time with both low birthrates and low death rates.

In the realm of population distribution policy, there is no widely accepted comparable theory that relates migration to a historical pattern of socioeconomic development. Wilbur Zelinsky proposed such a theory in 1971, calling it the theory of the mobility transition. The theory links a different pattern of mobility with each phase of the demographic transition. Large-scale rural-to-urban migration and emigration occur at the beginning of the demographic transition, in the period of rapid population growth. In the period of sharp fertility declines and more gradual mortality declines, however, rural-to-urban migration and emigration slow, while circulation increases greatly. In the advanced society with low fertility and mortality rates, people move often, but usually between cities.

The historical theory of the mobility transition, along with some economic theories (see p. M-252), implies that present-day migration patterns in developing countries are a natural phase in the desirable course of development. Studies of Indonesia, Peru, West Africa, and Italy, however, have cast doubt on how widely applicable the theory is. Moreover, the theory does not explain the causes of the mobility transition. Some economic theorists and researchers contend that current migration patterns are abnormal, impede development, and may be self-perpetuating rather than self-limiting (see p. M-262). There is no consensus on whether the current patterns of rapid urbanization and international migration are, on balance, harmful or helpful to economic development. The most recent thinking has led to a new perspective: the patterns, causes, and impacts of migration are varied and specific to the situation of each country. This perspective, combined with the disappointing performance of most population distribution policies, has led to the view that migration policy should try to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs of migration rather than try to stop existing flows.

Even as the goals of population distribution policy are being reassessed, so are the instruments of that policy. Research on the importance of rural-urban wage differentials has led to a new awareness of the effect of national economic policies and programs on migration. Minimum wage laws, food price controls, locations of government offices, communication and transportation projects—all these and more can influence migration patterns. Impacts on population distribution, however, usually play only a
small part in determining policy on these matters. Furthermore, in many countries private business, not government, makes many of the important economic decisions on employment and location of new factories. Therefore the search for appropriate migration policy instruments is broadening. Investigations into the migration decision-making process have raised the possibility that changing the information available about places, and so changing peoples' perceptions of those places, may be as effective as altering actual conditions. Even the evidence that migrants follow in the footsteps of their friends and relatives has generated ideas about how to trigger migration streams to new areas.

Impact of Family Planning Programs on Population Distribution

Population growth policies — for the most part fertility reduction policies implemented through family planning programs — also have an important role to play in population distribution policy (544). They:
- address the problem of high natural growth rates, which are the major source of urban growth;
- help to reduce the volume of migrants to more manageable levels;
- reduce the rural/urban fertility difference that contributes to migration.

Since roughly 60 percent of urban growth in developing countries is due to natural increase, any policy concerned with limiting city size and slowing the speed of city growth must include a family planning element. The difference in the development of cities between the developed countries in the late 19th century — the period of fastest city growth there — and in the developing countries in the past three decades has not been the rate at which the population migrated from rural to urban residence. Those rates of urbanization are similar. Instead, the difference has been in the numerical growth of urban populations. Higher rates of natural increase are responsible (132, 484). If slower city growth is a goal of population distribution policy, then family planning programs are needed to address the major source of that growth.

The sheer number of people moving to the cities has been an important reason for concern about urban growth. Slower rural population growth will reduce the supply of potential migrants to the cities, even if the same proportion of the population actually does migrate. This will give the cities more time to respond to growth.

Both data on past growth and projections of future growth suggest the impact of overall population growth on cities. An analysis of the growth rates of over 1,200 cities found that city growth and national population growth were related on a one-to-one basis: for every percentage point of difference in national population growth, there was about one percentage point of difference in city growth (484). A projection of the future of a representative but hypothetical developing-country city of 4,000,000 people in 1980 shows specifically the impact that slowed population growth could have on urban growth. The city is assumed to be growing currently at a rate of 4.4 percent annually, about two-thirds of that due to natural increase; one-third, to in-migration. A drop in the total fertility rate from 4.8 to 3.0 in the city and from 6 to 4.8 in the rest of the country by the year 2000 would reduce the city population in 2000 from 9.4 million to 7.9 million and in 2025 from 25 million to 14 million (194).

In developing countries, rural total fertility rates are commonly 20 to 60 percent higher than urban total fertility rates (see Table 6, p. M-259). In some countries, such as Paraguay and El Salvador, the rural rate is as much as twice as high as the rate in the capital city (40). These differences exacerbate the rural-urban income gap and so increase the motivation to move to the city. If there were no economic growth and other things remained equal, higher rural fertility — and thus a faster growing labor supply in rural areas — would mean that productivity, and therefore wages, would drop faster in rural than in urban areas. Economic development may aggravate the problem. As incomes rise and people buy more, the expansion of rural jobs is eventually constrained by the limited availability of agricultural land and by the fact that, once basic food needs are met, people spend a diminishing portion of their new income on food. By comparison, greater flexibility in the supply of raw materials and in the demand for manufactured goods allows urban employment to expand more easily. Thus the gap between rural and urban job opportunities increases even faster. Theoretically, reducing the difference between rural and urban fertility rates might at least slow the widening of the gap. The impact would be felt only over the long run, of course.

Thus family planning may have an important impact on migration and population distribution. Around the world, family planning programs have been implemented in order to improve the health of women and children, to reduce population pressures that slow economic growth, and to help families improve their well-being (437). Many programs have gone far toward achieving these goals, and at a reasonable cost. As the relationship between population growth policies and population distribution policies becomes increasingly apparent, the impact of family planning on population distribution will be counted among the benefits of family planning. At the same time, family planning programs will be recognized as an integral and essential part of population distribution policy.

Migration accounts for 40 percent of urban growth in developing countries. Children born to city dwellers account for 60 percent, but many are children of recently arrived migrants. (ILO)
Asterisk (*) designates an article that was of particular value in the preparation of this report.


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